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I. INTRODUCTION: DISCRIMINATION, ExPECTATIONS,
AND EXCEPTIONS
America's employment discharge policy begs for reform. Although most
states have created exceptions to the employment at will doctrine,' the doctrine
thrives. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 2 which bans
1 The employment at will doctrine is a doctrine at common law that permits the
employer to discharge an employee for any reason or for no reason at all. See Richard A.
Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, in LABOR LAW AND THE EMPLOYMENT MARKEr
3, 3-5 (Richard A. Epstein & Jeffrey Paul eds., 1985); see also infra notes 278-340 and
accompanying text; see generally RIcHARD A. POSNER, OvERCOMnNG LAw 299-311 (1995).
242 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994). The original federal employment
discrimination law was passed as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As amended, Title
VII states in relevant part:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
Since the passage of Title VII, Congress has passed laws banning age discrimination in
employment, see Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994), and discrimination based on disabilities, see Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12102, 12111-12117, 12201-12213 (1994) (corresponds to
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101-108, 104
Stat. 327, amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071).
Because the ADA requires different proof, my proposal does not cover the ADA.
The ADEA, in its relevant part, makes it unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
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discrimination in employment based on race, gender, color, religion, and
national origin, has proved ineffective in combating employment
discrimination.3 Despite the statutory and common law exceptions 4 to the
employment at will doctrine, today's employees may have less job security than
in the past. In a bygone era, large corporate employers rewarded employee
29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
3 See discussion infra Part II.
Title VII permits two types of suits: disparate treatment and disparate impact suits.
Although the law permits a group or class of plaintiffs to use disparate treatment cases to
allege patterns and practices of discrimination against protected groups, see generally
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), disparate treatment
suits are normally brought by individuals for discriminatory treatment in the workplace. See,
e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that in individual disparate
treatment cases an employer is liable for decisions made that are based on sexual
stereotyping). Disparate impact cases attack a facially neutral policy that has a disparate effect
on a protected group. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding
that requiring a high school diploma or the passing of a standardized general intelligence test
as a condition of employment violated Title VII because neither requirement bore a
demonstrable relationship to sccessful performance of the jobs while both had a
disproportionate effect upon blacks applying for the jobs). In disparate impact cases, plaintiffs
do not have to prove that the defendant engaged in intentional discrimination. Rather, they
merely have to show that the policy has a disproportionate impact on a protected class. The
burden then shifts to the employer to prove that the policy or practice is a business necessity.
Id. at 428-32.
Most employment discrimination cases brought, however, are individual discriminatory
treatment cases. See infra notes 61-86 and accompanying text. In these cases, plaintiffs must
prove that the defendant intended to discriminate. See infra notes 61-86 and accompanying
text. This Article and my proposal deal with individual discriminatory treatment cases and the
difficulties that arise because the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended to
discriminate.
4 The federal and state civil rights in employment acts are partially responsible for
common law exceptions to the employment at will doctrine. Civil rights plaintiffs expanded
the wrongful discharge law by including counts under state law in their complaints. One very
important reason for doing so, was to acquire a jury trial in a Title VII case where there
would otherwise be no right to ajury. Until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, there
was no right to a jury in a Title VII suit. See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the
Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VI and ADEA Cases, 34
B.C. L. REv. 203, 205 n.9, 210 n.26 (1993). Even if the jury would not decide the Title VII
issue, to the extent it would decide common fact questions, its determination would be binding
on the court hearing the Title VII claims. See, e.g., Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715,
737 (1988) (holding that jury finding on a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was binding
on judge in Title VII claim). Ironically, these statutory and common law exceptions to
employment at will have raised unrealistic expectations of job security for the average
worker.
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loyalty with job security. 5 Increasingly, today's employers ignore years of loyal
service; 6 the bottom line governs decisions concerning employee retentions or
dismissals. Even now that the major companies have weathered the recessions
of 1982 and 1989 and transition to a post-industrial economy, layoffs and
downsizing continue.7
Employment law scholars for the past twenty years have called for greater
job security for workers, arguing that either the courts8 or the legislature9
should overrule the employment at will doctrine. Recently, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has proposed a Model
Employment Termination Act ("META"),10 that would require an employer to
have "good cause" before firing an employee."
Although I applaud the Commissioners' efforts toward achieving justice in
5 IBM, Kodak, and Xerox, for example, have long harbored reputations for taking care
of their employees. See Paul B. Carroll, IBM Wants Its Managers to Encourage Certain
Workers to Leave the Company, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1991, at A4; Laurie Hays, Blue
Period: Gerstner Is Struggling as He Tries to Change Ingrained IBM Culture, WALL ST. J.,
May 13, 1994, at Al; IBM Ending "No Layoff" Policy, BUFFALO NEws, Feb. 16, 1993, at
B7; IBM Says It Will Resort to Layoffs, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 25, 1993, at 2D; John
McLaughlin, NYNEX Takes Dismal Road of Downsizing to "Up Profits," NEwARK STAR-
LEDGER, Dec. 19, 1993, § 3, at 3; Matt Murray, Thanks, Goodbye: Amid Record Profits,
Companies Continue to Lay Off Employees, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1995, at Al; John R.
Wilke, Management: Firms Oust "No Layoff' Tradition, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1990, at B1.
6 Hays, supra note 5; Laurence Hooper, "L" Word Is Official at IBM; Cutbacks to
Include First Layoffs in 50 Years, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1993, at B8; Murray, supra note 5;
Wilke, supra note 5.
7 See Murray, supra note 5 (demonstrating that large companies such as Procter &
Gamble, American Home Products, Sara Lee, Banc One, Xerox, AT&T, and Westinghouse
Electric continue to lay off employees even while their profits are increasing); Stuart
Silverstein, More Big Finns Cut Jobs Despite Economy's Rise, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 1994,
at D2.
8 See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967) (arguing for the
development of a tort remedy to protect employees against their employers' use of abusive
power against them); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary
Change in the Law, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 4, 21-26 (1979) (arguing that because of the heavy
regulation of employers by federal and state law, a private employer's discharge of an
employee is state action which violates the Equal Protection Clause and procedural due
process).
9 See Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. Rnv. 481 (1976) (arguing that state statutes should protect employees
against unjust dismissal).
10 MODEL UNIFORM EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr (1991), reprinted in 9A Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 540:21 (Aug. 8, 1991).
11See id. §3.
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the workplace, I believe that abolishing the employment at will doctrine through
state legislative enactment is a conceptually flawed approach. Partially due to
the decline of unionism in this country, 12 workers have little concerted power.
In order to pass important, protective legislation, workers need the support of
civil rights advocates. By its nature, state wrongful discharge legislation must
exclude federal employment discrimination claims from its coverage, thus
failing to marshal the political power of civil rights advocates in support of
strong protective measures for all workers. The result is inevitable. Because
individual employees have no power base, their representatives must
compromise heavily with employers, resulting in a Model Act that is
unacceptable to employees.13
Moreover, this exclusion of federal (and state) antidiscrimination law from
the coverage of wrongful discharge law ignores the causal link between
antidiscrimination legislation and common law exceptions to the employment at
will doctrine. The exclusion of antidiscrimination law also assumes incorrectly
that the antidiscrimination statutes effectively protect individuals from
discriminatory discharge. Given the failure of antidiscrimination law to protect
against unlawful discharge, Congress should create a consistent national
employment discharge policy. This policy would replace the current patchwork
of civil rights laws regulating workplace discharge. It would protect all workers
from unjust dismissals, 14 including workers currently protected by federal
antidiscrimination law. This law should abolish Title VII insofar as it protects
individuals from discriminatory discharges other than harassment and
retaliation. It should abolish the ADEA protection for individual employees. In
their place, the new Act should create protections from arbitrary discharges for
all workers, including those who currently are members of one or more
protected classes under Title VII and the ADEA.
Part II of this Article describes the history of antidiscrimination in
employment laws and recent trends in interpreting them. It posits that the
12 See Leonard Silk, Worrying Over Weakened Unions, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13,
1991, at D2.
13 Professor Cornelius Peck acknowledges this compromise, but comes to a different
conclusion. Where I call for national legislation, Professor Peck believes that because
individual employees lack power, courts should adopt new common law that is protective of
employees. See Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the
Development of the Law of Wrongfid Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REv. 719, 752 (1991).
14 1 focus on discharges because there has been a marked shift in Title VII suits from
discriminatory hiring to discriminatory firing suits. See John J. Donohue III & Peter
Siegelman, The Oanging Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 983, 1015 (1991). In 1966, 50% more hiring discrimination charges were made than
discharge cases. By 1985 this trend had reversed. That year, 19% of all charges filed with the
EEOC alleged discrimination in hiring, while 50% alleged discriminatory discharge. See id.
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protection antidiscrimination laws grant to individual employees is largely
illusory. Furthermore, it suggests causes for the decline in the laws'
enforcement and effectiveness. Part III analyzes the evolution of common law
and statutory exceptions to the employment at will doctrine and the Model
Employment Termination Act. In Part IV, I propose a federal wrongful
discharge statute that would provide a unitary solution to the problem of
unlawful discharge of all employees.
II. THE SURGE AND DECLINE OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN EMPLOYMENT
Title VII has utterly failed to achieve its corrective purpose of redressing
the individual rights of victims of discrimination in employment. By "utter
failure" I do not imply that Title VII has never compensated any victims of
discrimination. My complaint is that it does not protect the rights of the vast
majority of victims of modest income who suffer from hidden discrimination. 15
The public and the legislature appear blithely unaware of this failure. 16
The historical background of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act")17
may explain the general belief that Title VII provides an adequate remedy to
discrimination victims. Congress enacted the 1991 Act in the wake of the
confirmation hearings of Justice Clarence Thomas to the United States Supreme
Court. Analysts believe that the 1991 Act would not have become law but for
the angry public sentiment against sexual harassment engendered by the
hearings.18 Those who witnessed the confirmation hearings and the debate over
the 1991 Act heralded the Act for providing a remedy for the loss of personal
dignity suffered by an employee who is sexually or racially harassed.' 9 The
15 See infra discussion Part II.
16 See, e.g., Seth Faison, Jr., Rash of Suits Seen After Rights Act, N.Y. TZIEs, Nov.
30, 1991, atAl.
17 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C (1994)).
18 See, e.g., Cheryl R. Saban, Sexual Harassment: Does It Exist in Your Workplace?,
69 TRADE & IND. 282 (1993).
19 Since the 1991 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, when Anita Hill accused then
Supreme Court Justice nominee Clarence Thomas of sexual harassment in the workplace, the
charges of sexual harassment filed with the Equal Employment Opportmity Commission have
more than doubled from 6883 in 1991 to 14,420 in 1994. See Leslie Alderman, Surviving an
Office Romance Without Jeopardizing Your Job, MONEY, Feb. 1, 1995, at 37, 37; Jill L.
Sherer, Sexually Harassed, Host'. & HEALTH NErwoRKS, Jan. 20, 1995, at 54, 54.
Commentators have attributed this rise to a combination of the Hill-Thomas hearings and the
changes in Title VII in the 1991 Act. See EEOC Getting 80 to 100 Complaints Weekly Under
New Disabilities Law, Official Says, 1992 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 202, at A-8 (Oct. 19,
1992); Study Finds Sexual Harassment Awardsfrom EEOC Doubledfrom 1992 to 1993, 1994
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public focus of the 1991 Act on damages for sexual harassment furthered the
evolution of Title VII's protection from property to personal dignity rights. The
movement toward protection of personal dignity reflects the notion that
discrimination does not exist unless it is palpable. Harassment is palpable.
Subtle discrimination leading to an employee's job loss is not.
There is another phenomenon hindering the enforcement of Title VII: the
employment at will doctrine. The employment discrimination laws were
initially enacted to ensure that employers did not consider race or gender in
determining which individuals to hire, to maintain, to promote, or to fire; they
were never designed to ban an employer's arbitrary decisionmaking if his
decision was unrelated to race or gender. The employment at will doctrine,
which is the bedrock from which the antidiscrimination exception is carved,
narrowly circumscribes the property right created by the employment
discrimination statutes. Absent proof of intentional discrimination against the
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at D-9 (May 26, 1994) [hereinafter Study Finds Harassment
Awards]. It seems that there is more public acceptance for suits alleging sexual harassment. In
1993, 1546 Americans won a total of $25 million from their eniployers in sexual harassment
suits. See Lynn Ludlow, The Jury that Roared, S.F. ExAMNER, Sept. 4, 1994, at A16 (citing
statistics from the Center for Women in Government, Albany, N.Y.); Study Finds Sexual
Harassment Awqrds, supra at D-9. The vast publicity surrounding the Rena Weeks trial, see
discussion infra note 229, reconfirmed the public's notion that the law is extremely protective
of plaintiffs alleging sex discrimination. See, e.g., Jane Gross, Jury Awards $Z1 Million in
Sex Case, N.Y. TIMs, Sept. 2, 1994, at A16; Legal Secretary Was Harassed, Jury Decides,
STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Aug. 27, 1994, at 4D; Dennis J. Opatrny, Jury Sends Bosses
$7 Million Message: Ex-Secretary Wins Harassment Award, S.F. EXAMInER, Sept. 2, 1994
atAl.
I do not mean to imply, however, that the law has appropriately responded to sexual
harassment in all (or even most) of the situations where it is present. Nor do I imply that the
country supported Anita Hill at the time of the hearings or immediately thereafter. See Susan
Estrich, Gender, Race and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The Import of the
Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings: What Went Wrong, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393 (1992).
But sometime after the hearings, there seemed to be a groundswell that led to the enactment
of the 1991 Act and the election of many women representatives in Congress. See Jeanne
Cummings, Hill-Thomas Case Credited for Focusing Attention on Harassment but Women
Learn There Are Hazards in Filing Complaint, AT.ANTA J. & CoNsT., Jan. 22, 1992, at C1;
Ferraro Hails Women's Vote, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 19, 1996, at B7; J. Stephen
Poor, Rights Act's Retroactivity Still Disputed, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 27, 1992, at 19, 19.
Moreover, the Thomas hearings raised the spectre of the problem of black women facing
sexual harassment. Sexual harassment of black women is not merely a combination of the
injuries of sexual harassment and racism, but a separate wrong itself derived from a very
different history. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Gender, Race and the Politics of Supreme Court
Appointments: The Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings: Race, Gender and
Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1467 (1992).
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individual in a discriminatory treatment case, there is no individual right to an
equal opportunity to a job or to keep one's job.
Besides the shift from property to dignity rights and the employment at will
doctrine there are a host of serious obstacles facing potential employment
discrimination plaintiffs. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") is flooded with charges of discrimination that it cannot adequately
investigate. 20 Because of the need for extensive discovery, employment
discrimination suits are extremely expensive. 21 In the past ten years, courts
have aggressively used summary judgment to dismiss meritorious claims.22
Courts have required many employment discrimination plaintiffs to bring their
claims before commercial arbitrators who have little or no expertise in civil
rights law,23 and the Supreme Court has made it virtually impossible to prove
employment discrimination cases with circumstantial evidence.24 The remainder
of this Part examines these problems.
A. From Property to Dignity: An Evolution of Rights
When a plaintiff sues alleging employment discrimination, she sues to
redress two injuries: her deprivation of employment opportunities as well as the
personal injury she suffers resulting from the employer's use of her race, sex,
religion, age, or national origin in his decision to discharge her. These injuries
are based on violations of two very different rights. The first is a property right
to employment created by the employment discrimination laws. The second is a
right to personal dignity. 25
For years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("1964 Act") was enacted, the
law recognized only a violation of a plaintiff's property right. The measure of
damages for a violation of the employment discrimination laws was the amount
of compensation the plaintiff lost, or back pay.26 The 1964 Act did not permit
the court to award compensatory or punitive damages. 27
With the recognition of sexual and racial harassment as causes of action
20 See discussion infra Part ll.B.
2 1 See CoMMIssION oN TrE FrtuRE oF WoRKER-MANAGEmENT RELAToNs: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25-26 (Dec. 1994).
2 2 See McGinley, supra note 4.
23 See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
24 See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
2 5 In Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 66 FEP Cases (BNA) 581 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994),
the court stated, "[s]exual harassment strips the victim of dignity and self-respect. Such
harassment is degrading and dehumanizing." Id. at 582.
26 See McGinley, supra note 4, at 205 n.9, 210 n.26.
27 See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) (1988); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992).
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under Title VII, the traditional remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs were
insufficient to compensate the plaintiffs for the injuries caused to their personal
dignity as a result of the harassment. For example, a plaintiff could suffer from
a hostile work environment, but if she was psychologically tough enough to
stay in the job, there was no compensation for the loss of dignity she suffered as
a result of a violation of Title VII.2 8 When Congress enacted the 1991 Act, it
debated the question of compensation of harassment victims,29 a debate
resulting in the addition of compensatory and punitive damage awards under
Title V]I. 30
The harassment cases are high profile and compelling; Congress rightfully
recognized the personal dignity loss. But nowhere in the long debates over the
1991 Act did Congress address, or even seem to be aware of, the practical
difficulties of a typical plaintiff who can point to no instance of overt
harassment or discrimination. Although the loss to personal dignity is clear
where a plaintiff suffers from overt harassment, in cases where harassment is
not involved, there is often ambiguous or no evidence whatsoever of overt
discrimination. Although these plaintiffs may not have a cognizable claim for a
loss of personal dignity, many of them have suffered a loss of employment or
property rights. It has become extremely difficult to prove that discrimination
caused this loss.
One of the reasons for the difficulty is the increased employer awareness of
discrimination law and the lack of "smoking guns" as a result.31 Employers
who intentionally discriminate against employees can often hide their intent.
Another problem is the intent requirement itself. Even though an employer
may make discriminatory decisions, the plaintiff has no remedy unless she can
prove that the defendant has intended to discriminate. 32 Because racism and
sexism are such deep-seated phenomena, many people unknowingly make
decisions based on them.33 But courts will not find that decisions are race-based
or gender-based without proof of a clear intent to discriminate. This
28 If the situation was so terrible that she had to leave the job, courts would recognize a
claim of constructive discharge which would permit the plaintiff to collect back pay. See
generally Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994); Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge,
Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1996).
29 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 102-40(l), at 64-74 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 602-12. In fact, some circuits held there was no violation absent
psychological injury to the plaintiff. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th
Cir. 1986). This view was overturned in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
30 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, § 102(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991)
(codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1994)).
31 See McGinley, supra note 4, at 215 n.45.
32 See discussion infra Part lI.C.2.c.
33 See infra notes 135-48 and accompanying text.
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unwillingness may be partially responsible for causing the shift of Title VII
enforcement, from a statute that successfully vindicates a person's property
right to one that vindicates *a plaintiff's right to personal dignity; a
discriminatory discharge is not always obvious, but an affront to personal
dignity is usually overt.
To the extent the law fails to separate the two concepts of property and
personal dignity rights in the employment area, the law imposes the burden to
prove the impossible on individuals who suffer a property loss that is not
accompanied by overt discrimination. To ensure that working persons receive
the protections the law attempts to insure, the law should deal separately with a
plaintiff's loss of property and dignity.34
B. EEOC Administrative Overload
The EEOC was created by the 1964 Act. 35 The 1964 Act authorizes the
EEOC to prevent persons from engaging in discriminatory employment
practices. 36 It requires that a person alleging discrimination in employment give
the EEOC an opportunity to investigate the claim by filing a charge with the
EEOC and waiting for a "right to sue letter," before filing suit.37 When passing
34 1n United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 229 (1992) and Commissioner v. Schleier,
115 S. Ct. 2159, 2163 (1995), the Court refused to permit race and age discrimination
plaintiffs to exclude back pay and liquidated damages remedies from gross income. In
Schleier, the Court concluded that an action under the ADEA is not "on account of personal
injury or sickness." 115 S. Ct. at 2164-65. This view seems to see discrimination claims, at
least those brought before the 1991 Act, as a means of redressing property rather than
personal rights.
35 Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 241, 258 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-4 (1994)).
3 6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994).
37 The Commissioner serves notice of the charge on the employer and investigates the
charge. If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that the charge is accurate, it must try
to eliminate the illegal practice by informal methods such as conference, conciliation, and
persuasion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If these methods are unsuccessful, the EEOC may,
but is not required to, bring a civil lawsuit against the respondent. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1). If the EEOC decides not to bring a suit, it will issue a right to sue letter. See id.
If, in contrast, the EEOC finds that there is no probable cause for the charge, it will
dismiss the action and notify the claimant and the respondent. See id. After receiving the
dismissal notice, the aggrieved party may file a private civil action against the respondent. See
id.
If 180 days have passed and the EEOC has not made a determination whether reasonable
cause exists, the aggrieved party may go directly to court to file a civil action. See id. This
occurs in the vast majority of cases.
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Title VII, Congress did not anticipate the number of charges that would be filed
with the EEOC. As the number of claims with the EEOC has grown, the
agency has become increasingly mired in its own work, unable to decide
individual claims before issuing the right to sue letter.38 As of May 1995, the
EEOC had a backlog of over 100,000 cases, an increase from an average
backlog of 30,000 to 40,000 during the 1980s. 39 The EEOC has not been able
to keep up with the increase. From 1989 until 1994 resolution of discrimination
charges has increased by only 9.6 %.40 The ever-growing backlog, along with
new enforcement responsibilities resulting from the ADA41 and the effect of
fiscal restraint "have had a devastating impact on the country's chief civil rights
enforcement agency." 42
Charging parties, respondents, civil rights advocates, and employment
discrimination attorneys lack confidence in the EEOC's ability to handle the
caseload. 43 Although the EEOC has recently announced changes in its
processing of charges,44 it is doubtful that, absent a complete overhaul of its
powers and responsibilities, the EEOC will be able to accommodate the
caseload. 45
Because the EEOC and various state and local agencies enforcing the
federal civil rights acts and state and local human rights laws are so
overburdened, they have become ineffectual in resolving disputes between
38 See Sims v. MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059, 1062 (1994); Rolark v. University of Chicago
Hosp., 688 F. Supp. 401, 404 (1988).
39 See EEOC Adopts Charge-Priority System, 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (149 Analysis:
News and Background Info.) 13, 14 (May 1, 1995). The EEOC caseload has increased from
64,000 charges brought in 1991 to 95,000 brought in 1995, a 49% increase. See id. In 1995,
the first drop in charges brought before the EEOC occurred. See EEOC: Drop in Charges,
Inventory Attributed to Improved Procedures Adopted by EEOC, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 19, at A-1 (Jan. 30, 1996) (finding a 4% decrease in charges filed during fiscal
year).
40 See Peter Eisler, Complaints Now Sit for at Least a Year, USA TODAY, Aug. 15,
1995, at 1A.
41 See EEOC Getting 80 to 100 Complaints Weekly Under New Disabilities Law,
Official Says, supra note 19, at A-8.
4 2 EEOCAdopts Charge-Priority System, supra note 39, at 13. As of 1994, the average
time it took the EEOC to process a charge was 328 days. See Statement of EEOC Chairman
Casellas Before Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, May 23, 1995, 1995 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at D-23 (May 24, 1995).
4 3 EEOCAdopts Charge-Priority System, supra note 39, at 14.
44 See id. at 13.
45 Besides the EEOC's role in individual cases, it is authorized to bring test cases under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994) and to write interpretive guidelines, rules, and regulations
for the law under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1994). Although these latter functions are important,
the EEOC's primary function is to act as a gatekeeper in individual suits.
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employers and employees. The vast majority of claims brought before the
EEOC are not resolved by the agency, 46 and the vast majority of potential
plaintiffs cannot afford to bring suit in federal court.47
The financial barriers are insurmountable for all but the wealthiest of
litigants. 48 Because they require a showing that the employer intended to
discriminate for some illegal reason, employment discrimination suits foster
extremely costly discovery. 49 The financial and emotional toll these suits take
on plaintiffs discourages many victims of discrimination from bringing suit.50
Even the right to attorney's fees under the 1964 Act,51 a right that is essential,
does not compensate the plaintiff adequately. The costs alone can be exorbitant.
Many cases take three or four years, or more, to come to trial. This statute,
which is supposed to vindicate the rights of persons who are, by definition,
either unemployed or underemployed, permits only those who are
independently wealthy, or who have lost positions with very high salaries to
bring individual suits.52
The result: an elite group of employment discrimination plaintiffs recover
monetary awards, fueling an elite group of employment discrimination
4 6 See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
47 See COMMIssION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: FACT
RNDING REPORT 113 (May 1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION FAcr FINDING REPORT].
4 8 See COMMIssION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25-26 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS]. The Commission estimates that for every dollar transferred in litigation
to a deserving claimant, another dollar is spent on attorneys fees and the costs of handling
claims. See id. at 25. Furthermore, employers spend in excess of these direct costs to avoid
litigation. See id.; see also DUNLOP COMMIssION FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 47, at
111-13.
49 See Tom Wicker, Civil Rights Nominee Wrong Man for Job, ST. Louis POST-
DIsPATcH, July 7, 1989, at 3B.
50 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
51 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994).
52 See DuNLoP COMMIssION REPORT AND RECOMMvENDATIONS, supra note 48, at 25-26;
DUNLOP COMMION FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 47, at 113. Donohue and Siegelman
explain that the propensity of a discharged worker to sue will rise with the wages in the job
from which he or she has been rejected. This is because the cost of litigation remains fairly
constant while the rewards for a successful suit rise with the amount of wages lost. Donahue
& Siegelman, supra note 14, at 1006-11. This result was particularly true when, before the
passage of the 1991 Act, back pay was the primary monetary reward for winning a
discrimination suit. Since the passage of the 1991 Act, which amended the law to permit the
plaintiff to collect compensatory and punitive damages, the nature of the discrimination may
play a greater role in determining whether an employee decides to sue. If there is an obvious
affront to the personal dignity right, the opportunity to collect punitive damages will likely be
greater.
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lawyers. 53 Although many of these lawyers do an excellent job, workers with
average salaries cannot afford to hire them and pay the costs required to bring
discharge suits.
C. Judicial Hostility Toward Civil Rights in Employment
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court within the past five years
illustrate the problems facing employment discrimination plaintiffs. The first is
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks54 which virtually destroyed -the McDonnell
Douglas55 allocation of the burdens of proof and production where there was
circumstantial, but not direct, evidence of discriminatory intent. The second is
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,56 holding that defendants in ADEA
cases can force plaintiffs who have signed arbitration agreements to arbitrate
their discrimination claims. These two cases, along with the lower courts'
predisposition toward summary judgment in close cases, may sound the death
knell of federal discrimination discharge law, in spite of the 1991 Act. 57
Both St. Mary's and Gilmer represent a disingenuous approach to civil
rights law. In St. Mary's, the opinion distorts twenty years of Supreme Court
and lower court precedent.58 In Gilmer, under the guise of freedom of contract,
the Court virtually exempts a whole industry-the stock exchange-from the
civil rights laws.59 Even worse, Gilmer lends its approval to forced arbitration
of statutory rights based on an employee's uninformed signing of a predispute
arbitration clause. 6° As a background to the discussion of St. Mary's and
Gilmer, the next section will explain the history of the McDonnell Douglas.
standard.
53 See, e.g., Thorn Weidlich, Workplace Warriors: Wife/Husband Team Are Union-Like
Negotiators for Non-Union Workers, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 5, 1996, at Al, A21 (describing
employment law practice which reaps partners the same benefits as partners in corporate law
fims).
54 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
55 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing a three-stage
method of allocating burdens of persuasion and production in Title VII cases). See also
discussion infra Part II.C. 1.
56 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
57 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
58 See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
59 See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
60 See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
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1. Background History of the McDonnell Douglas Standard
The element of intent to discriminate has become increasingly difficult to
prove because normally there is no access to direct evidence of the employer's
discriminatory motives. 61 As a result, plaintiffs have turned to circumstantial
evidence to prove discriminatory intent. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,62 Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,63 and Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine,64 the Court constructed the three-stage method
of allocating burdens of persuasion and production known as the McDonnell
Douglas approach. The purpose of the evidentiary approach was to assure that
plaintiffs who have legitimate claims could prove their cases through
circumstantial evidence.65 Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff alleging that
she was fired due to illegal discrimination proved a prima facie case by
showing: (1) that she was a member of a protected class under the 1964 Act,
(2) that she was discharged, (3) that she was qualified for the job, and (4) that
the employer retained persons who were not members of the protected class.66
The purpose of requiring this initial showing was to eliminate the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action: the plaintiff's
lack of qualifications or the employer's lack of an available position. 67
Under the McDonnell Douglas construct, proof of a prima facie case
creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, shifting the burden of
production to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employment decision.68 Once the defendant makes this articulation, the
burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
articulated reason is pretextual. 69 Under Burdine, the plaintiff would prevail in
one of two ways. She could prove either that the defendant's articulated reason
was not true or that even if true, it was not the real reason for the employment
decision.70
For example, if the defendant met its burden of articulating a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's discharge by stating that the plaintiff
61 This is true because of employers' increased sophistication regarding the employment
discrimination laws. See, McGinley, supra note 4 and text accompanying note 31.
62 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
63 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
64 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
65 See McGinley, supra note 4.
66 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. For a thorough discussion of the
McDonnellDouglas formula, see McGinley, supra note 4, at Part I.B.
67 See McGinley, supra note 4, at Part I.B.
68 See id. at 218.
69 See id. at 218-19.
70 See id. at 219.
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was consistently late for work, the plaintiff could rebut the defendant's reason
by showing either that she was not consistently late for work or that other
employees who were not members of the protected group were also consistently
late for work and had not been fired. Either of these showings would result in a
victory for the plaintiff.
There were two reasons for the McDonnell Douglas formulation. First, as I
have already mentioned, because direct evidence of discriminatory intent was
increasingly difficult to obtain as employers became aware of the law, the
formula allowed the plaintiff to prove discrimination by circumstantial rather
than direct evidence.71 Second, because the plaintiff retained the burden of
proof throughout the proceeding, the plaintiff needed a full and fair opportunity
to rebut the specific reason the defendant gave for the employee's dismissal.72
Without this level of specificity, the plaintiff would be left to disprove reasons
for the discharge that the defendant had not even raised.
2. St. Mary's Sin: Dismantling McDonnell Douglas
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,73 decided by the Supreme Court in June
1993, changed the McDonnell Douglas formula. In St. Mary's, the plaintiff,
Melvin Hicks, a correction officer at the defendant halfway house, alleged that
the defendant fired him because of his race in violation of Title VII.74 The
district court concluded that Hicks had proved a prima facie case by a
preponderance of the evidence. 75 This proof shifted the burden of production to
the defendant to articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the
discharge. The defendant presented evidence that the defendant had fired Hicks
because he had repeatedly violated the rules, subjecting himself to discipline.76
The court concluded that the defendant's alleged reason for discharging the
plaintiff was pretextual. 77 It noted that similar and even more serious violations
of the rules committed by Hicks's coworkers did not lead to their dismissals. 78
In fact, Hicks was the only supervisor who was fired and disciplined for these
violations. 79
Even though the court found that the defendant's reasons for firing Hicks
71 See id. at 214.
72 See id. at 214-15.
73 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
74 See id. at 504.
75 See id. at 506.
76 See id. at 508.
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See id.
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were pretextual, it held for the defendant because the plaintiff had not proved
that the defendant's reasons were a pretext for discrimination.80 According to
the trial court, the plaintiff had merely proved that the defendant was lying in its
defense; he had not proved that the firing was racially, rather than personally,
motivated.81 Given that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had proffered any
evidence that there was any personal animus against the plaintiff, this was a
curious result. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed,
concluding correctly that according to McDonnell Douglas and Burdine and a
whole line of cases following Burdine,82 once a plaintiff proves that the
defendant's articulated reason for the employment decision is pretextual, the
verdict must go to the plaintiff.83
This result is undeniably correct under Burdine. Burdine sought to frame
the factual issues with specificity so that the plaintiff would have a "full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate pretext."84 Without this requirement of specificity
and the plaintiff's automatic victory upon proving the defendant's reason
pretextual, the plaintiff would have to disprove reasons for the defendant's
action that the defendant had not even presented. Since it is the plaintiff's
ultimate burden to prove discrimination, this result would be extremely onerous
on the plaintiff. It would require the plaintiff to prove direct evidence of
discriminatory intent or to raise and disprove every possible legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason the defendant may have had for firing the plaintiff.
Unfortunately for Melvin Hicks and other employment discrimination
plaintiffs, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision, and in a
disingenuous opinion by Justice Scalia,85 concluded that even though the
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711
(1983).
83 See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 509 U.S.
502 (1993).
84 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248; 256 (1981).
85 Justice Scalia denied that he was making any change in the law even though the law
had been settled for almost twenty years. See St. Mary's Honor Or. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
512 (1993). The dissent in St. Mary's notes:
But today, after two decades of stable law in this Court and only relatively recent
disruption in some of the Circuits .... the Court abandons this practical framework
together with its central purpose, which is "to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual
question of intentional discrimination."
Id. at 525 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248,255 n.8 (1981)).
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plaintiff has proved pretext, the ultimate issue of discrimination should go to the
jury to decide whether the plaintiff had met her burden.86 This is true even
though the defendant never presented any evidence that the reason for the firing
was personally, rather than racially, motivated. Thus, the St. Mary's decision,
in effect, requires the plaintiff to produce direct evidence of discrimination or to
rebut all of the potential reasons for firing her, even those never articulated by
the defendant. Furthermore, it would permit the jury to infer that the defendant
fired the plaintiff because of its personal dislike for the plaintiff, even if there is
not one scintilla of evidence to support this inference.
This result is clearly wrong. A finding that the defendant acted out of
personal animosity is not a complete defense to an employment discrimination
case. The cause of the personal animosity is relevant to the question of whether
the defendant had discriminated against the plaintiff. If the personal animosity
stemmed from racism, the plaintiff should logically prevail in a race
discrimination claim. But because there is no evidence of personal animosity
presented by the defendant, the plaintiff is unaware that he needs to rebut this
defense with a showing that the defendant harbored ill-will against him because
of his race. Thus, by requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
articulation was a pretext for discrimination, the Court drained the McDonnell
Douglas approach of any real meaning.
St. Mary's is a perfect illustration of the problems inherent in the
reasonable enforcement of the civil rights laws. There are three systemic causes
responsible for the result in St. Mary's: the underlying employment at will
doctrine, the plaintiff's burden of proof, and the requirement that the plaintiff
prove discriminatory intent.
a. Employment at Will: Rewarding Bad Acts
Because the employment discrimination law is a very narrow exception to
the employment at will doctrine, judges deciding employment discrimination
cases often rely on the employment at will doctrine to defeat the plaintiff's case.
In essence, these courts conclude that the employer has a "license to be
mean." 87 By this I mean judges often rely on the employment at will doctrine to
conclude that the mere fact that the plaintiff proved that he was wrongfully
discharged is insufficient to establish illegal discrimination. 88 Often the courts
86 See id. at 519.
87 Ann C. McGinley and Jeffrey W. Stempel, Condescending Contradictions: Richard
Posner's Pragmatism and Pregnancy Discrimination, 46 FLA. L. REV. 193, 211 (1994).
88 See, e.g., Independence Bank v. Wyskocil, 771 F. Supp. 1510, 1513 (C.D. Calif.
1991) (holding that an unfair or immoral reason for firing a person is not age discrimination);
see also Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991) (en band).
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are unwilling to permit a jury to infer that the employer's negative animus is
based in discrimination. 89
A particularly interesting example of this phenomenon is Judge Richard
Posner's opinion in Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates, Inc.90 In Visser,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated the ADEA91 by firing him
when he was sixty-four years old, only nine months before his pension would
fully vest, depriving him of two-thirds of his pension benefits.92 The defendant
company had gone through a bitter dispute over the conduct of Dr. Kenneth
Packer, the company's founder and chief executive officer, who allegedly had
stolen money from the firm. 93 Visser was a dissident member of the board who
brought a shareholder's derivative action against the corporation. 94 When other
dissidents left the company to form their own firm, Visser remained and Packer
demanded that Visser pledge loyalty to him. Visser refused and was fired.95
Visser arose three years before Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins96 which held
that firing an employee because his pension is about to vest is not age
discrimination under the ADEA. At the time the Seventh Circuit decided
Visser, a number of courts had concluded that firing an elderly employee to
produce a financial savings to the company constituted illegal age
discrimination. 97 In Visser, Posner assumes for the sake of argument that firing
an elderly employee in order to deprive him of his pension is violative of the
ADEA.98 Despite this assumption, however, he concludes that the district court
appropriately granted summary judgment to the defendant. 99 Posner reaches
this conclusion by relying on the employment at will doctrine. He agrees that
the plaintiff was wrongfully fired, concluding that Packer, who was stealing
from the firm, had no right to demand personal loyalty from his employee
because personal loyalty to him would require disloyalty to the firm. 1°° But
Posner disagrees that there was evidence to prove that Packer fired Visser to
89 See, e.g., Visser, 924 F.2d at 658 (described infra notes 90-107 and accompanying
text).
90 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991) (en bane).
91 See id. at 655.
92 See id. at 657.
93 See id. at 656.
94 See id.
95 See id. at 656-57.
96 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
97 See, e.g., Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1157 (7th Cir. 1989);
White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 1988); Metz v. Transit Mix,
Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1207 (7th Cir. 1987).
98 See Visser, 924 F.2d at 658.
99 See id. at 660.
1o See id. at 657.
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deprive him of his pension benefits.101
In fact, Judge Posner stresses that the plaintiff's showing that Kenneth
Packer was "a monster of vengefulness" 1 2 creates an inference that no age
discrimination occurred.1 03 He reasons that a person who is so vengeful would
unlikely retain a younger employee who had refused to pledge loyalty to
him.104 Posner reaches this conclusion despite the existence of three affidavits
showing that Visser was replaced with a twenty-nine year old employee and
that Packer was well aware of Visser's situation-that his pension would soon
fully vest. 105 Posner emphasizes that there was absolutely no evidence of age
discrimination. Posner states that the evidence
may show that Packer is a bad man. It does not show or even tend to show that
Visser was fired because of his age. It tends if anything to show the opposite,
because if Visser was fired because of his disloyalty to Packer the natural
though not inevitable inference is that he was not fired because of his age.
Certainly his age had nothing to do with the direction of his loyalties. 106
Particularly because this case was decided on a motion for summary
judgment, one can raise serious objections to Posner's decision, as three judges
did in their dissents. 107 But my purpose here is not to quibble with Posner's
analysis. Posner's decision demonstrates that discrimination suits hang by a
very thin thread. Underlying and undermining those suits is the employment at
will doctrine, which will defeat an employee's suit even though the employee
was wrongfully fired. In reality, the employer-employee relationship is so
complex that normally a number of intertwined events, experiences, and
motivations drive a decision to discharge an employee. Requiring an employee
to separate these motivations is nearly impossible, especially since the
employment at will doctrine underlying the relationship sanctions discharges for
reasons other than those prohibited by law. 108
In St. Mary's, the lower court also relied on the existence of the
employment at will doctrine to defeat the plaintiff's case, 109 a reliance that was
101 See id. at 658.
102 Id. at 660.
103 See id.
104 See id.
10 5 See id. at 659.
1)6Id. at 657.
107 See id. at 660-63 (Flaum, Bauer, Cudahy, JJ., dissenting).
10 8 The mixed motives approach to proof attempts to correct for this problem, but it still
requires an artificial proof-the separation of motives that probably cannot be divided. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
109 See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991),
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upheld by the Supreme Court. 110 Without the employment at will doctrine and
the inherent notion that the employer has a right to fire an employee for a bad
reason or for any reason so long as it is not an illegal reason, the trial judge in
St. Mary's could not have introduced the possibility of personal animosity as a
legal excuse for the discharge. But St. Mary's goes well beyond Visser.
Ironically, in St. Mary's, it was the judge who first introduced the personal
animosity defense.111 St. Mary's Honor Center did not rely on this defense.
Instead, it testified at trial that it fired Melvin Hicks for violating company
rules, testimony which was later found to be untruthful by the factfinder. 112
The Court in St. Mary's would defend its ruling by stating that the plaintiff
did not meet his burden of proof. Because defendant's lying about its reason for
firing the plaintiff is consistent with both a finding of discriminatory treatment
and a finding that the defendant did not like the plaintiff, the jury should decide
whether the defendant fired the plaintiff out of personal animosity or due to
discrimination.
This reasoning demonstrates my point. Without permission to make
decisions based on personal animosity, a permission granted by the employment
at will doctrine, the defendants in both Visser and St. Mary's would likely have
lost their cases. Moreover, as we shall see below, the combination of the
plaintiff's burden of proof, the requirement that the plaintiff prove
discriminatory intent, and the underlying employment at will doctrine places
deserving plaintiffs who possess no direct evidence of discrimination in a
precarious position. Without the protections afforded by the now defunct
McDonnell Douglas approach, these three factors conspire to deprive deserving
plaintiffs of their ability to prove their cases.
The courts are unlikely to embrace a new protective standard or revive the
McDonnell Douglas formula. Due to political1 13 and economic factors114 there
is a strong pressure on the federal courts to limit the force of the employment
discrimination cases, creating a constant but subtle erosion of the employment
discrimination laws. 115 There is little judicial incentive to read more protections
into the law. Therefore, it seems a bolder approach may be the only answer. So
long as the civil rights law is an exception to the employment at will doctrine,
"protected" employees will have inadequate protection.
rev'd, 970 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
110 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 (1993).
111 See Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1252.
112 See id.
113 See infra Part IL.C.4.a.
114 See infra Part ILC.4.b.
115 See generally McGinley, supra note 4.
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b. Plaintiff's Burden: Impossible Proof
Placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination
creates very difficult problems of proof that benefit the employer. If the
employer in St. Mary 'I 16 had the burden of proving that it did not intentionally
discriminate against the plaintiff when it fired him, there would have been no
doubt about the result. The defendant would have argued that it fired the
plaintiff for violating company rules. Because the lower court found that this
reason was pretextual, the defendant would not have been able to sustain its
burden of proof. The plaintiff would have prevailed. Because the employer has
access to the information concerning the plaintiff's discharge, it makes more
sense to place the burden of proof on the employer. 117 This is particularly true
when the case hinges on issues of intent. There is support for placing the
burden of proof on the employer. In labor arbitrations and many wrongful
discharge suits, the employer traditionally carries the burden of proving that
there was just cause for the employee's dismissal. 118
c. The Inappropriate Intent Requirement
Placing the burden of persuasion on the employee is particularly
problematic because the law requires the plaintiff to prove the employer's
discrfminatory intent. The intent requirement 19 creates substantive and
procedural difficulties that seem to defeat the intended purpose and goals of the
statute. The legislative purpose in passing the employment discrimination laws
116 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
117 In the insurance context, it is the insurance ompany's burden to prove that it was
harmed by the insured's failure to notify it of the claim in a timely manner. See JERE" W.
STEMPEL, INTERPRErAnON OF INSURANCE CoNTRACTs: LAW AND STRATEGY FOR INsURERS
AND PoucY HOLDERS 698-711 (1994).118 See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, HOW ARBrIRATION WORKS 7-76 (CUm.
Supp. 1985-89).
119 The 1964 Act states in relevant part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentiona!!y engaged in or is intentiona!!y
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay... or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
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was to deter discriminatory behavior 120 in order to provide equal work
opportunities for all Americans and to compensate victims of discrimination in
the workplace. 121 Requiring proof of discriminatory intent does not further
either of these goals; in fact, scholars have argued that the intent requirement
reinforces the perpetrator's perspective of the law, and undermines the goals of
the statute by legitimizing discrimination that is not obviously intentional. 122
Legitimization occurs because the law requires a search for a moral culprit. 123
To the extent the plaintiff cannot prove discriminatory intent, the law presumes
that no discrimination has occurred; the individual employer and the rest of
society are relieved of moral culpability for the discrimination. Where there is
sufficient proof that the employer intentionally discriminated against the
employee, society has found its sinner and can acquit itself of responsibility for
racism or sexism. This paradigm encourages an extremely narrow definition of
racism, exonerating any racism that occurs outside of the narrow confines of an
individual's invidious intent.124
Although somewhat ambiguous, the legislative history of the intent
requirement suggests that Congress did not contemplate its meaning or effect.
Initially, the House version of the 1964 Act did not include the requirement that
courts find an intent to discriminate. 125 The Senate amendment added the intent
120 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 526 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
121 See id.
122 See generally Crenshaw, supra note 19; Allan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MiNN. L. Rnv. 1049 (1978) (arguing that by focusing on the intent of the
individual wrongdoer and causation, the law adopts the "perpetrator's perspective" which
morally vindicates the rest of society which is responsible for structural discrimination against
blacks).
123 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1167 (1995) ("Every successful disparate treatment story needs a villain.").124 See generally Freeman, supra note 122.
125 See LEGISLAT1vE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF
1964, at 3001, 3006 (United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n. ed.,
1968). The House Bill, when it moved to the Senate, did not go through the usual
committee procedure. Instead, a substitute bill with amendments was worked out in
informal bipartisan conferences with the Majority Leader (Mansfield) and the Minority
Leader (Dirksen), and Senators Humphrey and Kuchel as the principals. See id. at 3001.
The Substitute Bill, No. 656, was voted on in the Senate and sent directly to the House
floor to vote on the bill without going to Conference Committee. The authors of the bill
agreed on this procedure in order to avoid a filibuster. See id. at 3001, 3010. For this
reason, there is no Senate Committee Report. Instead, there is a record of the floor
debates in the Senate and of the statements of the major authors of the bill in the Senate.
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requirement as a "clarifying" change because the authors of the Senate
amendment presumed that because the 1964 Act barred discrimination due to
membership in a protected class, "it would seem already to require intent, and,
thus, the proposed change does not involve any substantive change in the
title." 126 The author of this statement, Senator Humphrey, confused causation
with the employer's state of mind. It does not follow inexorably that intent to
discriminate is necessary in order to make discriminatory employment decisions
concerning members of the protected class. Senator Humphrey followed this
statement with an assurance that the change in the provision would "make it
wholly clear that inadvertent or accidental discriminations will not violate the
title .... "127 While this statement would seem to preclude the argument that
intent is not necessary to prove discrimination under the 1964 Act, it still does
not define "intent." Intent could mean that the employer performed an
intentional act whose foreseeable "natural and probable" consequences are to
deprive members of protected classes of employment.128 Under this definition
of intent, an employer's recruiting practices alone could subject him to charges
of discrimination if they lead to a work force that does not contain
representative numbers of persons from protected classes. If instead, intent
requires the employer to have an invidious discriminatory purpose when it
makes its employment decision, 129 this definition seems at odds with the
purposes of the 1964 Act.
Interpreted this way, the intent requirement relies on a number of false
assumptions that undermine the goals of the statute. First, the courts assume
that it is possible to ascertain and prove an individual's motive or intent.130
Second, contrary to the 1964 Act's legislative history, courts interpret the
antidiscrimination statute as punitive in nature.131 Third, the courts assume that
the employee is not harmed by unintentional acts of discrimination. 132
Proving discriminatory intent is extremely difficult for procedural and
substantive reasons. As I have demonstrated above, St. Mary's Honor Center
These statements, because of the unusual procedure used in formulating the 1964 Act,
are considered the most authoritative statements of legislative intent. See id. at 3001.
126 Id. at 3006 (quoting Senator Humphrey, explaining Senate substitute amendment No.
656 (June 4, 1964)).
127 Id.
128 Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires an intent to harm the victim before
discriminatory intent can be found).
129 See id.
130 See infra notes 134-53 and accompanying text.
13 1 See infra notes 154-73 and accompanying text.
132 See infra pp. 1472-73.
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has created significant procedural barriers. 133
Substantive barriers may be even greater. The discriminatory intent
requirement does not reflect the reality of how decisions are made in the
workplace, thus failing to account for complex psychological and cognitive
factors that influence an employer's decision. 134 It rests on the false assumption
that an employer who discriminates against an employee due to her
membership in the protected class is conscious of the racist or sexist roots of his
views toward the employee. Professor Charles Lawrence has demonstrated that
racist and sexist stereotypes that are rooted in the subconscious can affect the
manner in which a person processes information. 135 Since Professor
Lawrence's important work, Professor David Benjamin Oppenheimer in
Negligent Discrimination,136 has used psychological surveys and field and
laboratory studies to show that racism of whites against blacks is often
unconscious. Oppenheimer reviews psychological surveys that ask direct
questions about whether blacks should be treated equally in the workplace.
Although the vast majority of respondents agreed with equality of job
opportunity in theory, 137 many subjects in a series of experiments testing for
racism exhibited a high degree of both verbal and nonverbal racist behavior
resulting from adherence to racial stereotypes. 138
Studies supporting Lawrence's and Oppenheimer's theories abound. 139
White undergraduates, for example, who viewed a videotape of a black man
shoving another person described the episode as violent, but when the exact
same video was shown with a white man shoving another, white viewers
interpreted the activity on the screen as "playing around." 140 Perhaps even
133 See supra Part II.C.2.a. & b.
134 Congress seemed to recognize, however, that employers' decisions result from
multiple factors. It rejected an amendment to create liability for employment decisions made
"solely" because of a person's sex, race, color, religion or national origin. See LEGisLATnrvE
HISrORY OF TTL VII AND XI OF CIvIL RIGItTS Acr OF 1964, supra note 125, at 3124
(McClellan Amendment, No. 547, June 15, 1964). The Court's interpretation in St. Mary's
Honor Or. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), comes very close to adding the "solely" language
back into the statute.
135 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
136 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. RFv.
899 (1993).
137 See id. at 904.
138 See id. at 907-13 (citing several studies evaluating racist behavior).
139 See, e.g., Benson Rosen & Thomas H. Jerdee, The Influence of Age Stereotypes on
Managerial Decisions, 61 J. APP. PsYcH. 428 (1976); see also Oppenheimer, supra note
136, at 907-15 (surveying studies on racist behavior and stereotypes).
140 See Oppenheimer, supra note 136, at 914.
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more significant to the workplace, a 1990 study asked whites to compare
blacks' and whites' intelligence and industriousness. Over 53% of the subjects
rated African Americans as less intelligent than whites; 62.3% considered
blacks less hard working than whites.141 Like the white subjects who consider
blacks less intelligent and industrious, an employer will unknowingly rely on
subconscious stereotypes when evaluating the work product of employees of
different races, sexes, or ages.
In The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity,142 a very important work
to the understanding of the intent requirement, Linda Hamilton Krieger uses
social cognition theory to examine the constructs of proof in the
antidiscrimination law. Through reference to a vast array of psychological
research conducted in the past twenty years, Krieger argues that the
discriminatory intent requirement is fundamentally flawed because it does not
comport with the reality of how decisionmaking occurs. 143 Krieger
demonstrates that discriminatory stereotyping results from a normal cognitive
process of categorization rather than from the invidious motivational function
presumed by the law. 144 This process of categorization distorts the
decisionmaker's perception, memory, and recall for events that are relevant to
the decision and can lead to discriminatory results even though the
decisionmaker believes that he has made his decision without bias. 145 In fact,
because of the distortion caused by categorization, it is very difficult for the
decisionmaker to know the bases for the employment decision. 146
Krieger's research is a call to arms for those interested in the integrity of
employment discrimination law; it makes clear that the concepts underlying the
intent standard in the discriminatory treatment cases are based on outdated
psychological theories that are no longer held by the community of
psychologists doing research in cognitive theory. 147
Permitting employers to make employment decisions based on
subconscious stereotypes or cognitive categorization that distorts the employer's
perception can obviously defeat the purposes of the civil rights acts, especially
where the concept of proof requires discriminatory intent. But something even
more pernicious occurs. The object of the negative stereotype begins to
141 See id. at 908-09.
142 See Krieger, supra note 123.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 1164.
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See id.
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conform his behavior to that expected by the stereotype. 148 Thus, the
antidiscrimination law not only uses the improper measure to determine
whether employees are discriminated against in the workplace, reinforcing the
employer's belief that he is not discriminating against the employee, but the law
also creates the negative behavior in the victim. The law has a circular effect: it
legitimizes discrimination by exonerating an employer who has discriminated
and acquits the society that has reinforced the subconscious negative stereotypes
in the employer while simultaneously reinforcing the stereotype by creating
behavior in the victim that conforms to the stereotype.149
Although the law tries to prevent employers from making decisions based
on stereotypes about members of the protected classes, currently it reaches only
the cases where the employer has made overt remarks reflecting a stereotype
about a member of a protected group. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,150 for
example, the Court held that differential treatment of an employee, because she
does not meet a stereotype about how a woman should dress and act, is sex
discrimination. Hopkins, an accountant for the Big Eight accounting firm was
denied a partnership in the firm, in part, because she acted too aggressively for
a woman and did not dress or act in a feminine manner.151 Price Waterhouse
was an easy case, however, compared to most. In many individual
discrimination cases, the employer's perception and views of his employee's
merit are filtered through his cognitive function, reinforcing stereotypes existing
at the subconscious level that never surface during the relationship between
employer and employee. 152 Where there is no outward expression of the
employer's conscious or subconscious use of stereotypical views in its
decisionmaking, the employee has no evidence of discriminatory treatment. In
fact, Krieger posits that unless the employer is motivated by an invidious desire
to harm a member of the protected class or expresses a stereotypical belief
about the person's ability to do the job based on membership in a protected
class, there will be no evidence of discrimination because the employer has
unknowingly selectively interpreted the information he receives concerning the
employee's ability to do the job. 153
My second criticism of the intent requirement is that it relies on a false
assumption that a finding of discrimination is punitive in nature even though
148 See Mark Snyder, On the Self-Perpetuating Nature of Social Stereotypes, in
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 183 (David L.
Hamilton ed., 1981).
149 See id. at 193-210.
150 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
151 See id. at 228, 232.
152 See generally Krieger, supra note 123.
153 See id. at 1186-1217.
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nowhere in the legislative history is there reference to punishment as a
justification for the law. 154 Had the courts focused on the dual purposes of
compensation and deterrence articulated in the legislative history of Title
VII, 155 the intent requirement would not be interpreted as it has been. In
interpreting the 1964 Act, courts should consider whether proof of
discriminatory intent would appropriately lead to maximum deterrence of
discriminatory behavior and equal opportunity, as well as providing a remedy
to victims.
In tort law, courts have used a negligence rather than an intent standard to
maximize deterrent effect. In Negligent Discrimination, Professor Oppenheimer
argues for the application of a negligence standard to Title VII cases.156
Oppenheimer notes that there are already areas of Title VII law, such as hostile
work environment in sexual and racial harassment, that employ negligence
theories.157 He argues that a negligence rather than an intentional tort standard
in Title VII disparate treatment cases is appropriate because the psychological
literature strongly suggests that employers make discriminatory decisions
without realizing that they are discriminating. 158 Oppenheimer would hold an
employer liable for negligent discrimination "[w]henever [it] fails to act to
prevent discrimination which it knows, or should know, is occurring, which it
expects to occur, or which it should expect to occur."159 He would also impose
liability for an employer's breach of a standard of care established by statute if
the employer makes employment decisions that are based on seemingly neutral
processes having a discriminatory effect.16To the extent that a negligence standard would increase deterrence by
encouraging more employers to examine their employment decisions, I would
endorse such a standard. But Professor Oppenheimer's article fails to address
the types of proof that would be available to find an employer liable under a
negligence standard. For example, consider St. Mary's.161 It is possible that the
employer in that case subconsciously assigned to Mr. Hicks negative attributes
that he did not assign to Mr. Hicks's coworkers. The supervisor might have
read Mr. Hicks's infractions in a more negative way because, either
consciously or unconsciously he believed in the common stereotype that
154 See generally LEGISLATIVE H!STORY OF TITLEs VII AND XI OF CIviL RIGHTS Acr oF
1964, supra note 119.155 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
156 See Oppenheimer, supra note 136.
157 See id. at 934-67.158 See id. at 967-72.
159 Id. at 969.
160 See id. at 969-70.
161 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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African Americans are not as industrious as whites. To the extent, however,
that the supervisor is unaware of his own biases, the question is how the
negligence standard would help. If the standard were that a reasonable
employer would have looked at Mr. Hicks's violations and those of his
coworkers, and, if unable to justify different treatment, would not have
followed through with Mr. Hicks's discharge, the standard may work. Without
a shift in the burden of persuasion, however, this standard may not improve the
lot of employees who experience discrimination.1 62
Moreover, to the extent that a negligence standard would require an
employer to know the subjective reason for his behavior, it may not be in
accord with the psychological literature available today. According to Krieger,
social cognition theory suggests that instead of imposing a proscriptive duty not
to discriminate as the law does currently, the law should impose a "prescriptive
duty to identify and control for errors in social perception and judgment which
inevitably occur, even among the well-intended.' 63 But Krieger hesitates to
recommend the adoption of a duty to prevent oneself from operating in a
discriminatory fashion because she believes that cognitive theory has not
established the methods for reducing cognitive-based judgment errors. 164
Professor Susan T. Fiske, a psychologist from the University of Massachusetts,
would likely disagree with Krieger's conclusion. In a work predating Krieger's
article, Dr. Fiske argues that even though stereotyping results from cognitive
processes, the actor has the ability to control whether he or she acts as a result
of stereotyping. 165 Dr. Fiske defines intent differently from the way the law
normally does. She would find that a person acts intentionally if the actor has
options that are "at least potentially cognitively available to the individual." 166
According to Dr. Fiske, a person can intend an act subconsciously so long as
the alternative to the choice made is controllable. Dr. Fiske offers an example
to explain this definition of intent: a person sees a middle-aged black woman on
a suburban street and decides that she is a housekeeper. Although the individual
reaching this conclusion does not consciously consider the inference, if asked,
he would have to admit that there are alternative ways of thinking about the
black woman. According to Dr. Fiske, the individual should be responsible for
162 This is not to say that a negligence standard is unworkable; my concern is that by not
using examples, Oppenheimer has not demonstrated how it would work.
163 Krieger, supra note 123, at 1245 (emphasis omitted).
164 See id.
165 See Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role of Intent: Toward Understancing Its Role in
Stereotyping and Prejudice, in UNNthNDED THOUGHT 253 (James S. Uleman & John A.
Bargh eds., 1989).166 Id. at 259.
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the stereotype even though he did not consciously rely on it.167 In contrast,
according to Dr. Fiske, a small child who has been seriously misinformed may
be unaware that there are alternatives to thinking about the middle-aged black
woman. The child's stereotype, therefore, would not be intentional and would
not carry legal responsibility with it.168
Rather than use the law's definition of intent, one could possibly hold an
employer liable for failure to fulfill an affirmative duty to an employee. The
source of this duty would be analogous to the duty required in the "special
relationship" created in tort law where the relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant creates a duty to act afflrnatively. 169 Dr. Fiske's definition of
intent as the choice between a potentially cognitively available set of alternatives
would encompass a much wider scope of actions while holding an employer
responsible only for actions which, if he considered them, he could control. In
creating such a duty, however, the legislature should pay close attention to the
psychological literature. For example, a study by psychology professors
Randall Gordon, Richard Rozelle, and James Baxter demonstrates that persons
who have greater accountability and responsibility for hiring tend to rely more
heavily on stereotypes than those who do not bear the sole burden of making
167 See id. at 260.
168 See id.
169 See RFSrATEMEN (SECoND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). Section 323 states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things,
is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
Id.; see also Miller v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aft'd, 729 F.2d 1448
(3d Cir. 1984) (finding that executor of estate of informant in the Federal Protection Program
had a cause of action against the government for failure to protect the informant because of
the special relationship between the government and the informant).
One could argue that an employer who undertakes to employ a member of a protected
group also takes upon itself the responsibility to examine the company's processes in order to
assure that the process in which the members of the protected group are evaluated is not
tainted by unconscious prejudice.
Of course, Congress, while writing the 1964 Act, did not consider the possibility of a
special relationship because of its focus on discriminatory hiring rather than on discriminatory
discharges. See H.R. REP. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in LEG ATIWE HISTORY OF T Es VII
AND XI OF Crm RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, supra note 125, at 2001, 2147-51, also reprinted in
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355,2513-17.
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the hiring decision. 170 The authors of the study point out that these results are
counterintuitive because "[p]ublic policy generally assumes that accountability
in the form of record keeping and peer review will minimize bias." 171 Other
studies demonstrate that where there are no stereotypes upon which to rely, and
the expected response is unknown, accountability will tend to enhance the
accuracy of the information used in making the employment decision. 172 The
Gordon, Baxter, and Rozelle study suggests that processes in the workplace that
in the past have been used to justify employment decisions may, in fact, create
more of a reliance on stereotyping. Of course, maximum deterrence would
likely result from strict liability and one could argue that employers should be
strictly liable for their failure to hire, maintain, and promote a number of
members of the protected classes proportional to their presence in the labor
pool. Although this standard may be more efficient, a strict liability theory may.
require employers to establish statistical quotas that would likely create an even
greater backlash than the one the country is observing today in the affirmative
action debate. 173
Finally, the notion underlying the intent requirement-that employees are
not harmed by unconscious discrimination-is also false. Employees are just as
likely to be harmed by a dismissal due to unconscious racism as by a
consciously made racist dismissal. Economic harm will result from the firing
whether it is racially motivated or not. I do not contend that all dismissals are
equal because a member of a protected class suffers an inherent additional harm
if his or her dismissal is due to conscious consideration of illegitimate factors.
But the degree to which one suffers from a racist or sexist dismissal may not be
at all related to whether the person dismissing the employee intended to harm
her because of race or sex. In fact, the most hurtful dismissal may be a sexist or
racist one stemming from the employer's subconscious, or errors made by the
employer during cognitive processing. Precisely because the employee feels the
discrimination but the employer denies its occurrence, these dismissals may be
the most confusing and difficult for the employee who loses her job.
In contrast, if an employer harbors conscious racist or sexist thoughts or
attitudes but does not treat the employee any differently from his or her other
employees, the employer's intentional racism or sexism may not harm the
employee. In fact, this employer might be more careful about his or her
treatment of the employee in order to avoid illegal action.
170 See Randall A. Gordon et al., The Effect of Applicant Age, Job Level, and
Accountability on Perceptions of Female Job Applicants, 123 J. PsYcH. 59, 66-67 (1989).
171 Id. at 67.
172 See id.
173 See infra Part lI.C.4.d.
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Returning to St. Mary's,174 if the plaintiff had not borne the burden of
proving the defendant's discriminatory intent, he would likely have prevailed.
Instead of focusing on intent, the plaintiff would have demonstrated that he was
treated differently from other nonminority employees who committed the same
violations. Even if the intent requirement alone would not have made a
difference in St. Mary's, the intersection of the employment at will doctrine, the
plaintiff's burden of proof, and the intent requirement defeated the plaintiff's
claim. Had these three factors not coincided, Mr. Hicks would have won his
case.
Even before St. Mary's, the lower courts regularly distorted the substantive
standards of proof set forth by McDonnell Douglas175 by granting summary
judgment inappropriately in discrimination cases. I have already written an
article on summary judgment in Title VII and ADEA cases, and will not
belabor the point,176 but as I have already demonstrated, courts analyze
circumstantial evidence in a piecemeal fashion, draw reasonable inferences in
the defendant's favor when the defendant is the movant on a motion for
summary judgment, and make credibility determinations in the defendant's
favor. 177
The Credulous Courts article also demonstrates how the lower courts have
recently distorted the substantive requirements of Title VII. 178 This distortion
culminated with St. Mary's. The misinterpretation of the substantive standards
of both Title VII and the ADEA and the aggressive improper granting of
summary judgment in these cases are inextricably linked and have contributed
to the denial of many rights to civil rights plaintiffs.
3. Gilmer's Legacy: Arbitrary Arbitrations
While St. Mary's dismantled the McDonnell Douglas standard, making it
very difficult to prove discrimination through circumstantial evidence, Gilmer
v. Johnson/Lane Interstate Corp.17 9 deprives civil rights plaintiffs of their right
to bring discrimination suits against their employers before a jury in federal
court.
Gilmer dealt with the intersection of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA) 180 and the ADEA.181 Before Gilmer, it was widely accepted that suits
174 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).175 See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
176 See generally McGinley, supra note 4.
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
180 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
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brought pursuant to the federal discrimination laws were not precluded by
arbitration. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co.,182 the Court held that an
employee who had a Title VII action against his employer could maintain the
civil rights action in federal court even though the discrimination issue had been
arbitrated previously as part of the union's arbitration process. 183 The Gilmer
Court distinguished Alexander on three bases. First, the Court noted that in
Alexander, the question was whether the plaintiffs arbitration of his contract
claims precluded him from subsequently bringing suit in court to enforce his
rights under Title VII; it did not revolve around the enforceability of a contract
to arbitrate statutory claims.i84 Because in Alexander the employees had not
agreed to arbitrate the statutory claims, the arbitrator had no authority to decide
the statutory claims. 185 Second, where the arbitration occurs in the union
context, the Court noted the tension between the rights of the individual to be
free from discrimination and the collective rights under the collective
bargaining agreement. 186 The Court implied that the union representatives in
the negotiation process cannot agree to waive the right of the individual to bring
his statutory claim in the forum he chooses. 187 Finally, the Court noted that the
FAA, a statute which reflects a liberal policy toward arbitration, 88 was not a
consideration in Alexander.
In Gilmer, the plaintiff was the defendant's Manager of Financial
Services.' 89 As a condition of his employment, Gilmer registered with the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). 190 By signing the registration application,
Gilmer agreed to submit to arbitration any claim between himself and Interstate
"that is required" by the rules of the NYSE. 191 Rule 347 of the NYSE requires
arbitration of "[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and
any.., member organization arising out of the employment or termination of
employment of such registered representative."' 192
Gilmer was fired, after six years working for the defendant, at the age of
62.193 When he brought his age discrimination case against Interstate under the
181 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
182 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
183 See id. at 59-60.
184 See Gibner, 500 U.S. at 35.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See id. at 23.
190 See id,
191 Id.
192Id.
193 See id.
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ADEA, Interstate moved to dismiss and to compel arbitration based on the
arbitration clause. 194 The district court denied Interstate's motion to compel
arbitration, but the Fourth Circuit reversed. 195
The Supreme Court held that Gilmer was required to arbitrate his
discrimination claim against his former employer. 196 Noting that Gilmer was a
businessman, the Court rejected the argument that the unequal bargaining
power between the parties prevented Gilmer from knowingly and voluntarily
waiving his right to a jury trial as provided for in the ADEA. 197
The Court's opinion is troublesome for a number of reasons. First, it is
unclear whether Gilmer actually knew that he was waiving his right to a jury
trial if the defendant were to engage in age discrimination. Nothing in the
opinion even suggests that Gilmer read Rule 347 at the time he registered. If the
Court intended to require that the employee's waiver be knowing and
voluntary, it would have remanded the case for a factfinding hearing to
ascertain if Gilmer's agreement was in fact knowing and voluntary. 198
Even if Gilmer knew that by registering with the NYSE he waived his right
194 See id. at 24.
195 See id.
196 See id. at 35.
197 See id. at 33. The Court also refused to reach the question of whether section 1 of
the FAA excludes all employment contracts from the reach of the statute. See id. at 25 n.2.
Section 1 provides: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
A majority of the courts of appeals have interpreted this provision narrowly to exclude
only persons working in the actual transportation or movement of goods in interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d
Cir. 1972) (limiting exclusion to employees working in the transportation industry); Tenney
Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 450, 453 (3d Cir.
1953) (same). These interpretations are probably not proper statutory interpretation. See
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the
Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP.
RESOL. 259 (1991) (arguing that limiting the exception to workers in the transportation
industry lacks substantial support under all of the schools of statutory interpretation).
In Gilmer, the Court skirted the question of whether this interpretation is proper; it
concluded that section 1 did not exclude the contract from FAA coverage because the
arbitration provision was not a part of his employment contract; rather, it was contained in the
NYSE rules. See 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. Because Gilmer's contract incorporated by reference the
NYSE rules, see id. at 23, this seems to be a distinction without a difference.
Lower courts since Gilmer have held uniformly that the FAA may be invoked to compel
arbitration of employment disputes. See, e.g., Hull v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303 (E.D.
Mo. 1993); DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank of N.Y., 807 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
198 See Stempel, supra note 197, at 273.
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to have his civil rights claim decided by a jury, he had little recourse. The
industry requirement that its employees forego their rights to a jury trial
deprives industry employees of bargaining power. The only choice for persons
who are troubled by the arbitration requirement is to work outside of the
industry. Thus, the United States Supreme Court permits a whole sector of
industry to defeat the rights of its employees by forcing the employees to
arbitrate their statutory civil rights claims. A job applicant who desires to work
in the securities industry will likely sign the agreement in order to procure
employment. This signature may be knowing, but it cannot be characterized as
voluntary.
Moreover, by its -rejection of Gilmer's argument that the arbitration process
is biased against employees, 199 the. Court takes a formalist approach to the
problems employees commonly face before arbitration panels in the securities
industry. The Gilmer Court cavalierly relied on NYSE arbitration rules to
provide protection against biased panels,2°° but this reliance is sorely
misplaced. NYSE arbitrators are known for their bias in favor of the employer
in employment discrimination cases, and their failure to understand or to apply
discrimination law properly. 201
Compounding the problem is the arbitrators' power, which far exceeds that
of federal district court judges. The standard of review is extremely narrow-a
court can overturn an arbitration decision only "[w]here there [is] evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators." 202 This standard does not provide for
reversal even where the arbitrator uses improper legal standards. 203
Gilmer has had "'a substantial impact on employment litigation in the
securities industry."' 204 Employers have a greater chance of prevailing at
arbitration and when there are awards against employers, they are lower than
199 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.200 See id.
201 See Symposium, New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Symposium on Arbitration in the
Securities Induatry: Employment Discrimination, 63 FO aniM L. REv. 1613, 1613-14
(comments of Judith Vladeck) (1995); Margaret A. Jacobs, Men's Club: How Wall Street
Dealt with a Sex-Bias Case, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at Al. The NYSE arbitrators' lack
of preparation to decide discrimination cases is not necessarily the fault of the industry. The
Court's opinion in Gilmer shifted the responsibility for the development of public civil rights
law to securities arbitrators who had no training or experience in discrimination law. See
Symposium on Arbitration (comments of Judith Vladeck), supra at 1613-14.
202 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
203 See Flender Corp. v. Techna-Quip Co., 953 F.2d 273, 278-79 (7th Cir. 1992).
204 Securities Employers Faring Well in Mandatory Arbitration Since Gilmer, 1993
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 65, at A-7 (Apr. 7, 1993) (quoting Stuart Bompey, a partner of
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe).
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court awards. 20 5
The 1991 Act did not endorse the result in Gilmer. President Bush signed
the 1991 Act on November 21, 1991, six months after the Supreme Court
decided Gilmer.2°6 Although the 1991 Act did not specifically overturn Gilmer,
its purpose was clearly to preserve and improve upon the protection of the civil
rights of members of protected classes. 207 It expanded the rights of victims of
intentional discrimination by adding the right to collect compensatory and
punitive damages, 208 and by granting for the first time the right to a jury
trial.209 The 1991 Act does not disapprove of arbitration, but section 118 of the
1991 Act contemplates the use of arbitration as an alternative method of
resolving disputes that would supplement, not supplant, the right to a jury
trial.210 The legislative history of this section demonstrates that Senator Dole,
one of the more conservative members of the Senate, intended that any waiver
of a jury trial be knowing and voluntary. 211
Gilmer has had quick and startling repercussions. Most of the lower courts
have applied Gilmer reflexively to Title VII and other employment
discrimination cases including claims under state law.212 Like the Court in
Gilmer, these courts pay lip service to the concept of knowing and voluntary
waivers, but they do not hold factfinding hearings to determine whether the
plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily entered into the arbitration agreement.213
205 See id at A-8.
206 The Supreme Court decided Gilner v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991), on May 13, 1991.207 The stated purpose of the 1991 Act was: "[t]o amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
strengthen and improve federal civil rights laws, to provide for damages in cases of
intentional employment discrimination, to clarify provisions regarding disparate impact
actions, and for other purposes." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071, 1071 (1991); see also id. § 3 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)).
208 See id. § 102(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b) (1994)).
209 See id. § 102(c) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994)).
2 10 See id. § 118 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)). This section
states: "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means
of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation,
factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the
Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title." Id.
211 137 CONG. REC. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole).
212 See, e.g., Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that Title VII suit is subject to arbitration under the FAA); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); Hull v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303
(E.D. Mo. 1993) (staying Title VII, ADEA, and state human rights suit pending arbitration).
213 If an employer conditions employment on the signing of the arbitration agreement,
the signing is not voluntary. See, e.g., EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging, 67 FEP Cases (BNA)
1243 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (granting the EEOC an injunction, and preventing the defendant from
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Many of these courts use section 118 of the 1991 Act to support their
conclusions that the cases should go to arbitration, but ignore the requirements
of the section. 214
The only notable exception to the cases requiring arbitration is Prudential
Insurance Co. of America v. Lai,215 a sexual harassment case with a
particularly egregious fact pattern of harassment and dishonesty. In Lai, the
plaintiffs alleged that when they applied for their jobs as sales representatives,
they were required to sign U-4 forms containing agreements to arbitrate any
dispute required to be arbitrated under organizations with which they would
subsequently register.216 Plaintiffs subsequently registered with the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), which required that business
disputes be arbitrated.2 17
Plaintiffs alleged that at the time they filed the U-4 agreements, Prudential
told them that the forms were applications to take a required test, never giving
the plaintiffs an opportunity to read the forms. 218 Plaintiffs further alleged that
Prudential simply directed them to sign the papers, never mentioned arbitration
and never gave plaintiffs a copy of the NASD Manual, which contains the
actual terms of the arbitration agreement.219 Later, when the employees
brought their sexual harassment claims in state court against the employer, the
defendant brought a separate suit in federal court asking the court to compel
arbitration of the state law claims and to stay the state court proceedings. 220 The
federal district court granted the defendant's motion.221
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that an employee could not bind herself
to arbitrate her statutory claims unless she knowingly and voluntarily waived
her rights to bring suit in court.2 22 The Ninth Circuit relied on the legislative
history of section 118 of the 1991 Act, pointing out that, "Senator Dole
requiring its employees to sign its mandatory arbitration policy); see also Margaret A. Jacobs,
Policies Requiring Arbitration Challenged, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1995, at B5. There is an
even stronger argument that the waiver is not voluntary where a whole industry conditions
employment on the signing of the agreement.
214 See, e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.
1996) (requiring arbitration of ADA claims in collective bargaining context); Hurst v.
Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 93-15148, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 6940 (9th Cir. Apr. 4, 1994)
(holding Title VII claim arbitrable because of section 118).
215 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995).
2 16 See id. at 1301.
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 See id.
220 See id.
221 See id.
222 See id at 1305.
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explicitly declared that the arbitration provision encourages arbitration only
'where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods."' 223
The court emphasized that "our public policy of protecting victims of
sexual discrimination and harassment through the provisions of Title VII and
analogous state statutes" is "at least as strong as our public policy in favor of
arbitration." 224 It also noted that the remedies and procedures in arbitration are
significantly different from those available in court, and that in a sexual
harassment case these differences may be "particularly significant." 225 The
court concluded that because the plaintiffs in Lai did not even know that they
had signed an arbitration agreement, their waiver was not knowing and
voluntary. 226 Moreover, the court stated that even if the appellants had been
aware of the nature of the U-4 form, they could not have understood from the
language of the agreement itself that they were agreeing to arbitrate sexual
discrimination suits.227
The Supreme Court denied Prudential's motion for a writ of certiorari.2 28
Although this reaction is better for plaintiffs than a reversal of Lai, given
Gilmer's failure to show that he voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to
file his ADEA suit in court, there is still little protection for employees who are
not subject to the most egregious of facts apparent in Lai. Since Gilmer, other
industries besides securities have encouraged their members to require job
applicants to sign arbitration agreements. For example, law firms, especially
since the Rena Weeks case,229 have required that their associates sign
223 Id. (quoting 137 CONG. Rnc. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Dole)).
224 La, 42 F.3d at 1305.
225 Id.
226 See id.227 ,See id.
228 Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm. v. Lai, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995).
229 The largest ever individual sexual harassment award was given in Weeks v. Baker &
McKenzie, 66 FEP Cases (BNA) 581 (Cal. Super. CL 1994). See Harriet Chiang, Judge
Halves $Z1 Million Award in Harassment Case, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 29, 1994, at A15. Rena
Weeks, a secretary for the largest law firm in the world, Baker & McKenzie, alleged that her
employer had tolerated her supervisor's repeated sexual advances to her and to other women
in the firm. The jury held Baker & McKenzie liable to Ms. Weeks for $50,000 in
compensatory damages and $6.9 million in punitive damages, as well as costs and attorneys
fees exceeding $1 million. The jury also awarded punitive damages of $225,000 against
Martin Greenstein, the alleged harasser. The trial judge denied the defendants' motion for a
new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reducing the punitive damages award
against Baker & McKenzie to $3.5 million. The trial judge affirmed that the conduct by the
aggressor was abusive and that the firm's reaction was reprehensible. See Weeks, 66 FEP
Cases. (BNA) at 582.
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arbitration agreements waiving their fights to bring federal and state
discrimination claims in court.230 Because of a contracting market for new
lawyers, potential associates can hardly resist signing the agreements. To the
extent that an industry exercises a cartel, conditioning employment on the
execution of arbitration agreements, the industry, rather than the legislature, is
making (or destroying) civil rights in employment law.
Employment lawyers differ on the question of whether predispute
arbitration agreements231 can ever be knowing and voluntary. 232 A potential
plaintiff can never predict whether her future employer will violate her civil
rights and, if it does, what damage such violations will do; therefore, she can
not be assured that an arbitration panel will protect her rights. Moreover, job
applicants sign most predispute agreements to arbitrate when they apply for a
job or immediately after accepting a job offer. The applicant has no opportunity
to consult an attorney concerning the arbitration clause. Unless the job applicant
is extremely sophisticated about arbitration, she will most likely be unaware of
the power of the arbitrators to ignore statutory law, of the limited discovery
available in arbitration, and of the limited scope of review a court has over the
arbitrator's decision. Of necessity, she will waive her rights, but she will not do
so knowingly and voluntarily. 233
Honoring only those agreements to arbitrate that the parties make after the
dispute arises would protect employee rights because an employee entering a
postdispute agreement to arbitrate has the opportunity to bargain over the
particulars of her case, with the help of an attorney. The courts have not limited
230 See Richard B. Schmitt, More Law Firms Seek Arbitration for Internal Disputes,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1994, at B18. Law firms have also experienced a significant increase
in the number of discrimination complaints brought against them. See Richard C. Reuben,
Law Firm Bias Complaints Rising, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 12; see also Mark Curriden,
Sign it, Alston & Bird Staff Told, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 25 (discussing Atlanta firm
requirement that partners and associates sign arbitration clause as a condition of employment;
original draft contained a "white male provision," requiring that the arbitrator have at least 20
years' experience in a similarly sized law firm).
231 A predispute agreement is one entered into before the dispute arises. A postdispute
agreement to arbitrate is negotiated by the parties after the dispute arises.
232 See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Labor and
Employment Law, Final Report on Model Rules for the Arbitration of Employment Disputes,
50 Tnm REcoRD 629, 629-32 (Oct. 1995) [hereinafter Final Report].
233 Since Gilmer, there have been a number of bills introduced in Congress to overturn
the decision, but none have passed. See S. 366, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 4981,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 2405, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); House Democrats
Introduce Bill to Bar Compulsory Arbitration of Bias Claims, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 158, at D-4 (Aug. 18, 1994); Senate Bill Bars Mandatory EEOC Arbitration, 1994 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 160, at D-20 (Aug. 22, 1994).
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mandatory arbitration to postdispute agreements between employers and
employees most likely because of the courts' desire to eliminate a large number
of discrimination claims from court dockets. Voluntary programs that provide
for postdispute arbitration have not been successful. 234 We can attribute this
lack of success, in part, to ignorance. A more likely cause, however, is that
employees who have raised disputes with their employers are represented by
counsel, and counsel have advised against arbitration because of the limited
success plaintiffs have in arbitration of employment disputes.
Even though many plaintiffs' lawyers are uncomfortable with Gilmer, they
recognize the severe import of the decision. 235 Given the inevitability of
arbitration as a means of dealing with employment disputes, plaintiffs'
employment lawyers have joined with defense lawyers to propose standards for
arbitration of employment disputes. 236
234 For example, the New York State Division of Human Rights has had a voluntary
program encouraging parties to arbitrate cases awaiting trial before the Division. Although
this program has been in place for several years, in only two instances have parties opted for
arbitration. See Final Report, supra note 232, at 637.
235 Ironically, although Gihner is a bad decision for employment discrimination
plaintiffs, since the federal courts have shown an increasing lack of interest in protecting civil
rights litigants, the choice of a federal forum over an arbitral forum may not be such an
advantage.
236 See Final Report, supra note 232. The Model Rules for the Arbitration of
Employment Disputes ("The New York Model Rules"), authored by the Committee on Labor
and Employment Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, for example,
apply to predispute arbitration agreements. The New York Model Rules grant to parties in
arbitration many of the rights included in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There are
serious problems, however, with the New York Model Rules. The right to take only one
deposition weighs heavily in favor of the defendant. This is true because in an individual case
frequently the defendant needs to depose only the plaintiff, while there are a number of
persons within the defendant's organization whom the plaintiff should depose because they
have knowledge about the plaintiffs claim. See Final Report, supra note 232, at 641. The
provision for selection of an arbitrator favors employers. See id. at 643, n.47. More
importantly, the New York Model Rules extinguish a plaintiffs right to bring a wrongful
discharge or any other action under state law based on the termination. See id. at 640, 649.
This waiver would prevent an employee from bringing state law claims based on defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract, among others. See id.
Plaintiffs gain very little from the New York Model Rules because plaintiffs were limited by
the faults in the underlying civil rights law when they negotiated with the defense bar.
The New York Model Rules demonstrate the dangers of local compromise-although
certain members of the committee drafting the rules believed that no predispute agreements to
arbitrate should be enforced, the committee drafted the model rules to include positive
reference to predispute arbitration agreements anyway. See id. at 630. Thus, the Committee
has put its imprimatur on a system with which many employment lawyers would disagree.
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The Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
appointed by Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich on behalf of President Clinton
also endorses the use of voluntary arbitration to resolve disputes covered by
public law. 237 Although the Commission opposed the conditioning of a person's
job on signing an arbitration agreement, 238 it encouraged employers "to
experiment broadly with voluntary programs so the nation can gain experience
with this potentially valuable tool."'2 39 Unfortunately, the Commission did not
address seriously the question of what comprises a "voluntary" predispute
arbitration agreement. 24
4. Causes of Judicial Backsliding in Discrimination Cases
As we have seen, the convergence of St. Mary's and Gilmer with the
courts' ever-increasing willingness to grant summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases2 4 1 represents a severe encroachment upon the civil rights
of members of protected classes. While Gilmer prevents many plaintiffs from
bringing their statutory cases to court, even if a discrimination plaintiff gets to
federal court, St. Mary's makes it virtually impossible to prove a case of
discrimination using circumstantial evidence.
There seem to be four major causes of the courts' curtailment of civil rights
suits: (1) a more conservative federal judiciary appointed by Presidents Reagan
and Bush;242 (2) crowded court dockets resulting from the Speedy Trial Act243
and the litigation explosion; 244 (3) the persistence of the employment at will
doctrine bolstered by the law and economics movement;245 and (4) a backlash
against special treatment for members of classes protected by employment
discrimination statutes.246
237 See DUNLOP COMMIssION REPORT AND RECOMMENDAnONS, supra note 48.
238 See id. at 32.
239 Id. at 32-33.
2 40 The Commission set up standards, however, for an arbitration system that would
fairly address employees' concerns. Such a system would include: (1) a neutral arbitrator; (2)
a fair and simple method to bring a claim; (3) a fair method of cost-sharing between the
employer and the employee; (4) an employee's right to independent representation; (5)
remedies equal to those provided in litigation; (6) a written opinion; and (7) judicial review
ensuring that the result is consistent with governing laws. See id. at 31.
241 See generally McGinley, supra note 4.
242 See discussion infra, Part II.C.4.a.
243 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1994).
244 See discussion infra Part II.C.4.b.
245 See discussion infra Part ll.C.4.c.
246 See discussion infra Part II.C.4.d.
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a. Conservative Judiciary: Corporate Tastes
In Civil Rights in Employment: The New Generation,247 Professor Linda
Holdeman notes that the Supreme Court's civil fights decisions of 1989248
signaled a major policy shift from that reflected in the Court's early decisions
interpreting Title VII. 249 Initially after passage of the 1964 Act, the Court's
decisions furthered the congressional intent of eradicating employment
discrimination.25 0 The 1989 cases, which elevated the interests of advantaged
groups over those of disadvantaged groups, demonstrated the Court's shift
away from an aggressive policy to achieve racial and sexual equality. Professor
Holdeman's explanation rings true not only for the Supreme Court. Lower
courts have also become increasingly conservative when deciding
discrimination claims.
With the election of Presidents Reagan and Bush and their appointment of
more and more judges to the federal bench, the federal bench took a decided
turn to the fight.251 Presidents Bush and Reagan openly considered candidates'
politics before nominating them for the federal bench. 25 2 Approximately 90%
of President Bush's judicial appointments were white; 85 % were male. 253 Even
though President Clinton has filled more than 100 vacancies in the federal
district and appellate courts with a large percentage of women and minorities
who one would expect to reach liberal decisions in discrimination disputes,
Clinton appointees still represent only 16.6% of federal district court judges and
10.8% of appellate judges who are in active service. 25 4 Bush and Reagan
appointees continue to dominate the judges in active service on the federal
bench. As of January 1995, 60% of federal district court judges and more than
71% of federal appellate judges were Reagan or Bush appointees. 25 5 Empirical
247 Linda Holdeman, Civil Rights in Employment: The New Generation, 67 DENy. U.
L. REv. 1 (1990).
248 See, e.g., Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).249 See Holdeman, supra note 247, at 46-47 & nn.235-38.
250 See id. at 46 & nn.236-38.
25 1 See Paul M. Barrett, Federal Appeals Judge Embraces Liberalism in Conservative
inmes, WAm ST. J., Mar. 15, 1996, at Al.
252 See id. In contrast, President Clinton made it clear that his administration would not
conduct ideological screenings of judicial candidates. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial
Selection Under Clinton: A Midtenn Examination, 78 JUDICATURE 276, 279 (1995). President
Clinton sought to choose candidates on the basis of intellectual ability and judicial
temperament. See id.
253 Goldman, supra note 252, at 281, 287.
254 See id. at 291.
255 See id.
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studies show that in discrimination cases, federal judges appointed by President
Reagan vote more conservatively than other Republican judges and much more
conservatively than judges who are Democratic appointees.256 The large
percentage of sitting federal judges appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush,
therefore, accounts, at least in part, for the bench's increased conservatism in
deciding discrimination claims.257
b. Crowded Dockets: Search for Efficiency
The Judicial Conference of the United States has recently studied crowded
dockets in federal courts. 258 Its study describes a momentous increase in civil
filings in federal district and appellate courts.259 This increase has
proportionately exceeded the number of additional judges appointed to the
bench. 26 From 1940 until 1995, civil cases filed in the federal district courts
increased from 34,734 to 239,013 annually.261 From 1970 to 1995, district
court filings, both civil and criminal, increased from 317 to 436 per year per
judge.262 Not only do the federal judges have more cases to decide, but those
cases have also increased in complexity. 263
Although the criminal caseload of federal judges has fluctuated significantly
over the past twenty years and criminal filings are down slightly, a look at the
number of criminal filings alone does not accurately demonstrate the
256 See Timothy Tomasi & Jess Velona, Note, All the President's Men? A Study of
Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 766, 783
(1987) (concluding that although in most areas of the law Reagan appointees did not vote
much more conservatively than other Republican judges on the bench, one obvious exception
was the discrimination cases). This study found that in nonunanimous appellate decisions in
discrimination cases, Reagan appointees took the liberal side of the case 24% of the time
while other Republican appointees took the liberal position 39% of the time and Democratic
appointees took the liberal position 69% of the time. See id.
257 President Clinton, during the first half of his first term, nominated a large percentage
of "nontraditional" candidates to the bench, most of whom were confirmed by Congress. See
generally Goldman, supra note 252. By "nontraditional" the author refers to persons of color
and women. See id. at 280.
2 58 JuDicAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COuRTS (1995) [hereinafter JuDIciAL CONFERENCE].
259 See id. at 10-11.
2 60 See id.
261 See id. at 15. These filings are projected to increase to 976,500 in the year 2020. See
id.
262 See id. at 10.
263 See id.
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contribution of criminal cases to the crowded federal court dockets.264 Criminal
cases filed in federal court are more complex than in the past and they represent
an increasingly large percentage of the federal district courts' trial calendar. 265
The Speedy Trial Act,266 which requires that criminal cases come to trial
expeditiously, effectively gives trial priority to criminal cases. 267 The
imposition of mandatory minimum sentencing and the new federal sentencing
guidelines have encouraged more criminal defendants to go to trial and to
refuse to plea bargain.268 In some judicial districts the large percentage of
criminal trials has produced significant delays in civil Suits. 2 6 9 Although no data
exists yet, the 1994 Crime Act which provided for expanded federal penalties
for violent crimes270 will likely move civil cases even further down the list of
cases awaiting trial.271
Besides the congestion caused by the criminal cases and the general
increase in civil filings, federal courts have experienced a tremendous growth in
the number of employment discrimination cases filed in the past twenty years.
Between fiscal years 1970 and 1989, there was an increase of 2166% in
employment discrimination cases, as compared with an increase of 125%
during the same time period for the general civil caseload. 272 This increase has
264 See id. at 10-11.
265 See id. at 10-12. For example, the number of multiple defendant cases has grown by
47% since 1980. See id. at 12. In 1972, criminal cases represented one-third of the total
filings in federal court and 40% of the trials. See id. In 1994, even though the criminal filings
were only 13 % of the filings, the criminal cases accounted for 42% of the trials. See id.
266 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1994).
267 Criminal cases must be tried within 70 days of the defendant's original appearance.
See id. Because judges are assigned new criminal cases each month, they must process
criminal cases constantly and steadily. See Diana E. Murphy, The Concerns of Federal
Judges, 74 JUDICATURE 112, 114 n.3 (1990).
268 Murphy, supra note 267, at 114 n.1.
269 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 258, at 11; see also Victor Williams, Solutions to
Federal Judicial Gridlock, 76 JuDICATuR 185, 185 (1993); Garry Sturgess, Another Clash
over Criminal Caseload, LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 1, 1991, at 7 (quoting Chief Judge Aubrey
Robinson, Jr.: "With the imposition of the Speedy Trial Act, sentencing guidelines,
mandatory minimum sentencing, and the series of anti-drug and anti-crime laws enacted since
1984, something has had to give. Of necessity, it has been the civil-justice system that has
suffered most.").
270 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (1994).
2 71 See DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 48, at 26
n. 1.
272 See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 14, at 985. The authors posit that the increase
is due to a variety of factors: primarily, increased unemployment; an increase in the labor
force of members of the protected classes; the increase of younger, more sophisticated women
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placed considerable pressure on the federal courts to dispose of these cases in
more efficient ways, a pressure that has led, in part, to the courts' increased
use, and I have argued, misuse, of summary judgment in these cases,273
movement away from the McDonnell Douglas approach,2 74 and a movement
toward the approval of the use of mandatory arbitration in employment
discrimination cases. 275
Although docket pressure alone probably does not account for the shift in
treatment of employment discrimination cases, the docket pressures coincided
temporally with the appointment of a more conservative judiciary276 and fewer
claims of overt discrimination.277 This collision has seriously undermined the
rights of plaintiffs discharged due to illegal discrimination.
c. Employment at Will: Law and Economics
As illustrated above by St. Mary'S278 and Visser,279 judges' use of the
employment at will doctrine severely limits the protection of the employment
discrimination statutes. Even though courts have created limited exceptions to
the at-will doctrine, they have persistently upheld the doctrine of employment at
will.
The emergence of the law and economics movement has provided
theoretical support for the derogation of the antidiscrimination statutes and the
retention of the employment at will doctrine. Advocates for the movement
argue that employers act to maximize profits. 280 Rational employers, therefore,
would never fail to hire or discharge an employee for anything but good
cause.281 Besides the obvious economic disadvantage of firing a productive
worker, economists contend that employers in a competitive market who
discharge workers for irrational reasons cannot compete with other firms for
workers. Thus, they argue, employers will act rationally and discharge only for
and minorities in the workforce; the passage of new statutory provisions; and the increase in
the integrated work force. See id. at 988-1015. Doctrinal changes created by judicial opinions
such as the disparate impact cause of action produced a minimal increase. See id.
273 See McGinley, supra note 4.
2 7 4 See discussion of St. Mary's, supra Part II.C.2.
275 See discussion of Gilmer, supra Part II.C.3.
276 See supra Part II.C.4.a.
277 See supra Part II.A.
278 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
279 Visser v. Packer, 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991) (en bane).
280 Although this may be an accurate assumption, it is not adequate to explain all
motivations for employers' actions.
28 1 See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRMINA ON (1971).
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just cause and there is no need for a just cause requirement.282
In the hiring context, Professor Gary Becker has noted that persons who
decide that they do not want to trade with others due to their race, sex, or age
are making a decision that will limit their own opportunities for advancement
and success. 28 3 The more irrational the preferences and the greater the pool of
persons who are considered off-limits, the greater the harm to employers who
decide to exclude them and the greater advantages to the competitors. 284 Thus,
Becker concludes that a competitive market will drive out all forms of
discrimination because discrimination is irrational for employers to pursue.28 5
Although he differs with the conclusion that all employment discrimination
is irrational and will thus be driven from the market in the absence of
regulation, Professor Richard Epstein in his recent book, Forbidden
Grounds,286 argues for the elimination of the antidiscrimination statutes. Epstein
argues that some discrniination is rational because it can lead to more efficient
workplaces. Epstein opposes regulation of private industries because a group
that can minimize its differences in tastes will be more efficient in some cases.
To the extent that tastes diverge, it may be more difficult to achieve a common
goal. Harmony of tastes and preferences, according to Epstein, will work in the
long term interest of all members of the group.287
Other commentators and scholars have demonstrated convincingly that
discrimination is rational.288 For example, as Richard H. McAdams has noted,
a group that identifies with persons of like kind will cooperate to the economic
detriment of another group for the purpose of raising the group's status. 289 This
cooperation breeds conflict with other groups, emphasizing racial differences
and supporting greater exclusivity and greater success of the dominant
groups. 290
2 82 See Note, Employer Opportunism and the Need for a Just Cause Standard, 103
HAiv. L. REv. 510, 511 (1989).283 See BECKER, supra note 281, at 39-54.
2 84  ee id.
2 85 See generally BECKER, supra note 281.
2 86 RIaHARD A. ES=EI, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAiNsr EMPLOYMENT
DisCRMUNATION LAWS (1992).
287 See id. at 61-69.
2 88 See id. (concluding that employers who hold bonuses for employees to prevent
shirking in the early years of employment make a rational decision to discharge productive
employees as they age in order to avoid paying the bonuses or pension benefits).
289 See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production andRace Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1003 (1995).
290 See id. But see Leroy D. Clark, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment, 79 GEo. L.J. 1695 (1991) (reviewing David A. Strauss, The Law and
Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment, 79 GEo. L.J. 1619 (1991)) (arguing that
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Although economics provides a valuable tool in analyzing legal issues, it is
often based on questionable assumptions about the availability of information
and human behavior. For example, the conclusion that an employer cannot
attract workers because workers will have information about the employer's
opportunistic discharge practices assumes that prospective employees have
access to information about the employer's discharge practices that they may
not have, either because they are afraid to ask, or because the firm projects an
inaccurate picture of job security.291
Moreover, personal biases can cloud the lens through which a supervisor
will evaluate an employee. Whether these biases are conscious or subconscious,
race-based decisions occur. For example, employees tend to be more
comfortable with persons like themselves and seek to surround themselves with
them. This tendency can create a situation where the evaluator misjudges the
subordinate's work without an intent to do so. Thus, his evaluation can be
irrational even though he does not believe or intend it to be.
Furthermore, economic theory assumes that the person whose goal is to
maximize profits is the same person who makes the decision to discharge an
employee. This assumption is not entirely accurate. Often the decision is made
by a lower level supervisor whose salary does not depend on making a rational
decision. If the decision is made by a manager who has responsibility for
maximizing profits, often he or she must rely on the first-hand impressions of
lower level supervisors, who may have evaluated the employee through a
biased lens.
A complete review of economics literature is beyond the scope of this
Article, and I do not mean to distort the theories of Becker, Epstein, and others
who use economics to discuss antidiscrimination law. My point is to
demonstrate how pervasively economic theory has penetrated the law. Epstein's
views, in particular, have received an enormous amount of attention.292 Epstein
discrimination is irrational and that more, rather than fewer, disparate treatment cases would
help the cause of racial nondiscrimination).
291 See Note, supra note 282, at 524.
292 See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and
Structural Remedies for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 Gao. L.J. 1659
(1991); John J. Donohue, Ill, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment
Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. Riv. 1583 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSrEIN,
FORBMDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINSt EMpLoYmENT DISCmIATION LAws (1992));
Title VII Symposium: A Critique of Epstein's Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1
(1994) (including articles by W.B. Allen, Ian Ayres, David E. Bernstein, Lea Brilmayer,
Robert Cooter, Drew S. Days, III, Andrew Kull, Evan Tsen Lee, Jerry L. Mashaw, Richard
H. McAdams, J. Mark Ramseyer, and Christopher T. Wonnell); J. Hoult Verkerke, Free to
Search, 105 HARv. L. Rav. 2080 (1992) (reviewing Eprn, supra). These are only a few
of the many law review articles addressing Epstein's views.
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has moved the discussion decidedly to the right. Rather than debate whether the
law should be distributive or corrective, for example, the discourse concerns
whether antidiscrimination law should exist at all. These economic theories
have affected judges' attitudes toward antidiscrimination law, leading to a more
conservative interpretation of antidiscrimination law.293
d. Backlash: White Male Resistance
The increased use of the employment discrimination statutes to sue
employers has created a backlash by members of unprotected classes against the
giving of "special treatment" to members of classes protected by the civil rights
statutes.294 There are two reasons for this backlash. First, the 1964 Act was
passed in an era of great economic growth.29s As the economy shrinks, and
jobs become more competitive, it is more difficult to be magnanimous.
In an expanding economy, there are more job opportunities for members of
the protected classes, jobs that they will not take away from their unprotected
counterparts. Rather than taking a piece of the pie intended for a white male
worker, blacks and women in an expanding economy can share in the pie
because the pie is much larger.296 Theoretically, with a larger pie, there is no
need for redistribution.297 Thus, the 1964 Act could be corrective in nature
without Congress's having to make the hard choices concerning
293 An example of a sitting judge who unabashedly applies law and economics theory to
the cases he decides is Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit. See generally McGirley
& Stempel, supra note 87.
294 Gilbert Casellas, Chair of the EEOC, believes that the most formidable barrier
currently facing the EEOC is the backlash caused by the debate on affirmative action, even
though the EEOC is not an affirmative action agency. See EEOC Adopts Charge-Priority
System, supra note 39, at 15.
295 See H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in LEGISLAT=vE HIsrORY OF TmES VII
AND XI OF CIvIL RIGHs Act OF 1964, supra note 125, at 2001, 2151, also reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355,2516.
296 An interesting corollary is that when the economy shrinks, plaintiffs bring more
employment discrimination suits. Donohue and Siegelman have concluded that the "single
most important factor explaining the growth in the employment discrimination caseload over
the period from FY 1970-1989 is the increase in the unemployment rate." See Donohue &
Siegelman, supra note 14, at 990.
297 Studies of the results of affirmative action in government contracts show that women
workers fared less well as a result of affirmative action than their black counterparts. See
generally Jonathan S. Leonard, Woman and Affirmative Action, 3 J. EcON. PERSp. 61 (1989).
There has occurred, however, a massive shift in the gender composition of the workforce
between 1960 and 1980, which may be due to a combination of a "massive shift in female
labor supply" and the threat of litigation under Title VII. Id. at 64.
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redistribution.298 The legislative history supports this view. Proponents of Title
VII repeatedly justified the 1964 Act in terms of economics and international
competition. The House Judiciary Committee Report projected that
employment needs in "practically every professional and technical field are
expected to rise substantially," and "requirements for managers, clerical
workers, sales workers, craftsmen, foremen, and similar skilled occupational
groups are all projected for large increases. ' 299 According to the House
Committee on Education and Labor Report, discrimination was an ineffective
use of our manpower resources,3°° which eventually would lead to an inability
to compete with the Soviet Union and Red China and to maintain the country's
economic superiority. 301
Second, the number of protected classes has increased greatly. Title VII
protects persons from being fired on account of their race, color, sex, religion,
or national origin. 3°2 The ADEA protects persons from being fired because of
their age.303 The ADA protects persons from being fired because of their
disabilities. 304 Courts have interpreted "disabilities" broadly to include drug
and alcohol addiction and mental and emotional problems. 305 This is a fairly
comprehensive list, which has led young white males to feel that they have been
singled out for unfair treatment. 306 This feeling has created a backlash against
the protections of federal and state antidiscrimination statutes, influencing
federal judges to limit the protections of antidiscrimination statutes. This
backlash is partially responsible for both the curtailment of federal statutory
civil rights and the growth of state common law exceptions to the employment
at will doctrine discussed in Part H below.
298 One study has found that federal contractors, when asked to describe their goals,
claim that they will accommodate more women and minorities "by increasing the size of the
total employment pie," rather than by replacing white men with women and minorities.
Leonard, supra note 297, at 71. This study appears to demonstrate the lack of acceptance of a
redistributive goal of antidiscrimination law.
2 99 H.R. REP. No. 88-914, supra note 295, at 2151.
300 See H.R. REP. No. 87-1370 (1962), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HisroRY OF TILES
VII AND XI OF CIvm RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, supra note 125, at 2155, 2157.
301 See id.
302 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
303 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
304 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
305 See, e.g., Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1040, 1054 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing 28
C.F.R. 35.104), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 772 (1996).
306 See, e.g., Paul Craig Roberts, The Rise of the New Inequality, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6,
1995, at A20. ("Over the past two decades we have inadvertently created a caste society in
which there are two classes of citizens: those who are protected by civil rights laws and white
males, who are not.").
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MI. THE ERODED BUT PERSISTENT EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE
A. Common Law Exceptions
At the same time that federal courts cut back on employees' civil rights,
state courts have expanded the rights of at-will employees through state
common law. Although the employment at will doctrine was once an
impenetrable sheath, courts have pierced it with many holes.307 Public policy
exceptions, 308 breach of an implied in fact contract, 309 implied covenants of
good faith and fair dealing, 310 the increased use of the law of defamation in the
workplace, 311 and the creation of contractual rights in employment manuals312
are some of the theories the courts have used to avoid unfair application of the
employment at will doctrine. 3 13 By the early 1990s employees filed
approximately 10,000 wrongful discharge suits annually in state courts. 3 14
It is no accident that the number of exceptions to the employment at will
307 For an excellent description of the history of the common law exceptions to the
employment at will doctrine, see Peck, supra note 13.
308 Professor Peck tias noted that there are five categories of cases protecting employees
from firings violating public policy: "(1) discharges for refusing to violate criminal or civil
laws; (2) discharges for having performed civic duties or statutory obligations; (3) discharges
for asserting statutory or constitutional rights or privileges; (4) discharges for socially
desirable performances not required by law; and (5) discharges for what are recognized as
socially reprehensible reasons." Peck, supra note 13, at 744.309 See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 383 (Cal. 1988) (holding that the
plaintiff had alleged a cause of action for the breach of an implied in fact contract created by
the employer's course of conduct).
310 See, e.g., id., at 765 P.2d 389-402 (recognizing a cause of action for breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but limiting recovery to contract damages).
311 See, e.g., Hanson v. New Tech., Inc., 594 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 1992); Donald Seifinan
& Craig W. Trepanier, Evolution of the Paperless Office: Legal Issues Arising Out of
Technology in the Workplace, 21 EMP. REL. L.J., Winter 1995, at 5; Ex-Snet Employee
Awarded $580,000, HARTFORD COuRANT, Dec. 15, 1995, at A41; Jan Crawford Greenburg,
Reference Ill Will Spurs Worker Suits, CM. TRM., Nov. 30, 1995, at Ni; Jonathan Marshall,
Employers May Find Safety in Silence, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 29, 1995, at Cl; Kerri Smith,
Fired? What Do You Say when Interviewing for Another Job?, AmZ. REPUTBuC, Aug. 7,
1995, atE4.
312 See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffinann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264, modified,
499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (holding that an employment manual can bind the employer
contractually to its provisions).
3 13 The vast majority of courts recognize some exceptions to the employment at will
doctrine. Only a handful of states do not recognize exceptions. See Employment at Will: State
Rulings Chart, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51-52 (Aug. 27, 1996).314 See DUNLOP CO OMISSION FACr FI DING REPORT, supra note 47, at 112-13.
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doctrine took a giant leap after the passage of the 1964 Act. Although in 1959,
a court of appeals of California had decided Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396,315 holding that a discharge of a union
business representative for refusing to commit perjury at a state legislative
committee hearing was unlawful, it was not until the mid-1970s when judges,
expanding on Petermann, began to recognize varying exceptions to the
employment at will doctrine. 316 The judicial creation of common law
exceptions was fueled by a number of law review articles, all written after the
passage of the 1964 Act, 317 arguing that either the courts or the state legislature
should amend the employment at will doctrine. 318
Professor Peck notes that during the 1970s, when the exceptions to the
employment at will doctrine were emerging, between thirty-five and forty
percent of the nonagricultural work force was protected from discharge without
cause. 319 Although employers did not need just cause to fire members of
protected classes under federal and state employment discrimination statutes,
the civil rights acts imposed additional limitations, on the employer's power to
discharge as he wished, broadening the class of workers protected.
This broad protection, whether perceived or real, had an effect on both
unprotected workers and on judges deciding employment cases. It gave
employees at will false expectations concerning their own rights in the
workplace. 320 Moreover, judges, who were accustomed to enforcing
315 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
316 See Peck, supra note 13, at 724.
317 See Blades, supra note 8; Peck, supra note 8; Summers, supra note 9.
3 18 The presence of the federal employment discrimination laws was not the only cause
for the exceptions to the employment at will doctrine. A RAND Corporation study found that
there was a strong positive correlation between the extent of unionization in a state and its
willingness to adopt exceptions to the employment at will doctrine. See JAMES N. DERTouZos
Er AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION 14, 49-50
(1988). Although correlation does not prove causation, this study suggests that the presence of
many workers with rights limiting the employer's freedom to discharge may affect the
judiciary's view toward the employment at will doctrine in the non-unionized context. It
appears that the state judiciary reacted to the antidiscrimination laws in the same way. See
Peck, supra note 8, at 3-4, 44-46.
319 Professor Peck estimates this figure by combining the 28% of the nonagricultural
work force that was employed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, 95% of whom
were protected by just cause provisions in the collective bargaining agreement, with the large
number of federal and state employees who had protection from discharge without cause. See
Peck, supra note 13, at 729-30.
320 This perception may not have resulted solely from the existence of the 1964 Act. It
may have preceded the 1964 Act's passage. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, United States Report,
18 RurrGERs L. REv. 428, 432-33 (1964) (explaining that [before 19641 employers and
employees had changed expectations regardless of whether there was a collective bargaining
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employees' statutory claims by awarding back pay under the discrimination
statutes, sought to remedy employer unfairness when faced with lawsuits that
did not constitute statutory violations. 321
More recently, once informed of their lack of rights vis-a-vis their
protected coworkers, young white male at-will employees have fought back.322
This backlash seems to have influenced the state courts to create exceptions to
the employment at will doctrine in order to level the playing field.
I do not imply that the employment at will doctrine is dead. In fact, it
thrives. 323 Although it seems that there are many exceptions to the doctrine,
those exceptions are limited, however, and vary from state to state.324
agreement: "[B]oth... now expect fair treatment and fair dealing, proof before discipline,
and uniform enforcement of reasonable rules of conduct and discipline."). At the time
Blunrosen wrote this article, there was no federal antidiscrimination act and only twenty of
the fifty states prohibited discrimination in hiring, promotion, and discipline based on race,
creed, color, or national origin. See id. at 429.
For empirical data on the expectations of employees and employers, see Frank S. Forbes
& Ida M. Jones, A Comparative-Attitudinal, and Analytical Study of Dismissal of At-Will
Employees Without Cause, 37 LAB. L.J. 157, 165-66 (1986). Forbes and Jones conducted a
random telephone survey of Omaha, Nebraska residents. They learned that only 15% to 22%
of respondents knew that employers had the right to terminate employees at any time without
cause. The vast majority of respondents believed that it was unethical for employers to fire
employees without cause. Most of the respondents would agree with a law that would force
employers to demonstrate it had cause before firing employees. See id.
32 1 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands of Workers into the Twenty-
First Century: The Future of Labor and Employment Law, 68 IND. L.J. 685, 700 (1993).
322 See, e.g., Jeremy Iggers, January Roundtables to Feature Divisive Topic of Race
Relations, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Dec. 21, 1992, at 3E; Catherine S. Manegold, Fewer
Men Earn Doctorates, Particularly Among Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1994, at A14;
Clarence Page, Backlash; Affnrmative Action: What You Don't Hear, PHOENIX GAzErE,
Mar. 4, 1993, at A15; Judy Pastemak, Service Still kin-Deep for Blacks, L.A. TIMEs, Apr.
1, 1993, at Al; Richard J. Trzupek, Don't Confuse Opportunity with Results, CI. TRIB.,
Mar. 30, 1993, at N12.
323 For an egregious example of the victory of the employment at will doctrine over
sanity, see Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 630 (Nev. 1995). In Bigelow, the court dismissed
the case for failure to state a cause of action. The complaint alleged a violation of Nevada
public policy when an employer fired a white employee for supporting the rights of blacks in
the workplace. The complaint alleged that the employer had reprimanded the plaintiff for
being a "fucking nigger lover" and that the plaintiff had been dismissed because he told a
coworker that, "blacks have rights too." Id. at 632-33. According to the Nevada Supreme
Court, even if these allegations are true, the firing would not violate Nevada public policy
because the employer did not dismiss the employee for a refusal to carry out employment
tasks that were contrary to public policy or for performing acts that were endorsed by public
policy. See id. at 635.
324 Despite the public perception fueled by the media that employees get very high
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Consider the public policy exception. 325 The underlying theoretical basis
for the public policy exception is that the employee's dismissal violates the
state's public policy. The scope of the exception, therefore, depends on the
courts' interpretation of the term "public policy." Conceivably public policy
could include a policy to keep as close to full employment as possible. If this
broad definition applied, one could argue that in light of employees' reliance on
their jobs for income, health care, and pension benefits, and because of the
state's interest in keeping unemployment low, it is against public policy to fire
an employee without just cause. 326
No court has defined public policy so broadly. In fact, many of the states
recognizing the public policy exception have defined public policy very
narrowly. According to these courts, public policy is embodied only in
legislative enactments. 327 An employer does not violate public policy by firing
an employee unless he demands that the employee violate the law in order to
keep his job.328
Another exception is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The majority of courts have refused to recognize the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in employment contracts. 32 9 But even those recognizing
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing have interpreted it very
conservatively. As Professor Peck has demonstrated, the implied covenant
could theoretically require an employer to have "good cause" for terminating
an employee. However, the great majority of courts adopting the implied
awards for wrongful discharge, a RAND Corporation study demonstrates that even in
California, a state known for its liberal approach to wrongful discharge law, the average
amount of damages collected by plaintiffs alleging wrongful discharge, after post trial
reductions, attorney's fees, and costs, was only $30,000. After discounting this sum for lost
interest, the study concluded that the typical plaintiff receives approximately the equivalent of
one-half year's severance pay. See DERTouzos Er AL., supra note 318, at 39. This amount is
significantly lower for women and persons over 50 years old. See id. at vii. These figures
take into account both winning and losing plaintiffs in jury trials where plaintiffs were
successful in approximately 68% of the cases. See id.
325 For a description of the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine,
see Christopher L. Pennington, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-At-Will
Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1583 (1994).
326 When I discuss "discharge" or "firings" here, I am not including layoffs necessary
to the financial stability of the business.
327 See, e.g., Crockett v. Mid-American Health Servs., 780 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (stating that an employer violates public policy if it discharges an employee for
his refusal to violate the law).328 See Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 630 (Nev. 1995).
329 See Peck, supra note 13, at 739 (relying on Employment at Will: State Rulings
Chart, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505: 51-52 (Aug. 27, 1996)).
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covenant as an exception to the employment at will doctrine have not found a
good cause requirement.330 Montana and Idaho appear to be the only states that
have read a just cause requirement into the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. 331 Most courts that imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
require only a showing of subjective good faith belief on the employer's part
that the discharge was the appropriate discipline for the employee's
infraction.332 As Professor Peck demonstrates, this standard tolerates errors of
supervision to the employee's detriment. 333 Moreover, the measure of damages
in these breaches is crucial. In California, which recognizes the implied
covenant, the courts limit recovery to contract damages, 334 even though the
covenant is implied by law, not by the contract itself, and, according to
Professor Peck, tort damages are more appropriate.335
A final example of the weak protections afforded by the common law
exceptions to the employment at will doctrine is the employee handbook
exception. According to this exception, an employee manual or handbook
creates an enforceable contract to dismiss an employee only for just cause or to
use the procedures outlined in the manual. 336 This theory is extremely limited,
even dangerous to employee rights. Because its theoretical underpinning is that
the manual language creates a contract, courts have held that the employer can
escape liability by making an obvious disclaimer in the employment manual, 337
by unilaterally changing the handbook, 338 or by merely employing the
procedures for discharge outlined in the handbook. 339
Even worse, some courts have permitted employers to enforce arbitration
clauses appearing in employee manuals even though the employees have not
voluntarily and knowingly waived their rights to bring their statutory cases to
330 See id. at 739-40.
331 Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas, 778 P.2d 745 (Idaho 1989); Dare v. Montana
Petroleum Mktg., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d
713 (Mont. 1983) (Gates I1); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982)
(Gates 1).
332 See Peck, supra note 13, at 740 and cases cited therein.
333 See id.
334 See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389-402 (Cal. 1988).
335 See Peck, supra note 13, at 742-43.
336 See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmaan-La Roche, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 499 A.2d 515
(N.J. 1985).
337 See, e.g., Smith v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 620 A.2d 265 (D.C. App. 1993);
Hanson v. New Tech., Inc., 594 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 1992); Arnold v. Diet Ctr., Inc., 746 P.2d
1040 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987).
3 38 See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 735 (Ala. 1987) (citing
HENRY H. PEurr, JR., EMpLOYEE DMUssAL LAWAD PRACricE 150 (1984)).
339 See MacNeil v. Minikoda Mem'l Hosp., 701 P.2d 208, 209 (Idaho 1985).
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courtS 4° This use of the handbook by the employer as a sword rather than by
an employee as a shield can be hazardous to the employee's rights in the
workplace.
Ironically, although these exceptions to the employment at will doctrine
grant only limited job security to workers, their existence, together with the
broad coverage of the antidiscrimination acts, has heightened employees'
expectations that the law will protect their interest in fair treatment on the
job.341 Unfortunately, these heightened expectations have no basis in reality for
the average worker. In fact, heightened expectations in job security can be
destructive to workers. Employers unfairly benefit by the employment at will
doctrine if the employees enter work believing that they have rights they do not
actually possess.
Professor Theodore J. St. Antoine, the reporter for the Drafting Committee
on the Uniform Employment Termination Act342 of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, estimates that there are between
150,000 and 200,000 persons dismissed annually without just cause. 343 St.
Antoine describes the "devastating financial impact" of lost income and the
"increases in cardiovascular deaths, suicides, mental breakdowns, alcoholism,
ulcers, spouse and child abuse, and impaired social relationships that follow in
the wake of job loss. '344 Furthermore, employees who lose their jobs may also
lose health insurance for themselves and their families.345 "[O]ne of the most
important determinants of health insurance coverage" is employment.346 Given
the devastating effects of job loss, national public policy should protect at least
those workers who innocently lose their jobs.
Although economists argue that the employment at will doctrine is fair to
employers and employees because it imposes mutual obligations on employers
340 See, e.g., Lang v. Burlington No. R.R., 835 F. Supp. 1104, 1106 (D. Minn. 1993)
(holding state law wrongful discharge claim arbitrable under arbitration provision of employee
handbook); Corion Corp. v. Gih-Horing Chen, 124 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 57,220 (D. Mass.
1991); Fregara v. Jet Aviation Bus. Jets, 764 F. Supp. 940 (D.N.J. 1991).
341 See Forbes & Jones, supra note 320, at 165-66.
342 MODEL UNIFORM EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr (1991), reprinted in 9A Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 540:21 (Aug. 8, 1991).
343 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Model Employment Termination Act: A Threat to
Management or a Long-Overdue Employee Right?, in PROCEEDiNGs OF NEW YORK
UNVrmsrnY 45TH ANNuAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 269, 270 (Bruno Stein ed.,
1993); MODEL UNIFORM EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr, supra note 342, at 540:21, :23.
344 St. Antoine, supra note 343, at 270.
345 See Health Coverage: Nwnber of Uninsured Persons Increased to 36.6 Million in
1991, 20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 114 (Jan. 18, 1993).
346 See id. at 114.
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and employees, 347 St. Antoine argues convincingly that contract law no longer
requires mutuality of obligation, but consideration.348 An employee's rendition
of services provides consideration for the contract. 349
Moreover, market theory does not reflect the reality of the contracting
process for the average employee. In a recent article, Professor J. Hoult
Verkerke erroneously concludes that courts should reaffirm the employment at
will doctrine as a default rule. 350 Verkerke conducted empirical research of 221
employers in five states to determine the types of contracts existing between
employers and employees. 351 His data shows that 52% of employers contract
explicitly for employment at will, 33% have no contractual documents
governing the relationship, and 15% contract explicitly for just cause
protection. 352 The data demonstrates that the state's wrongful discharge law had
little or no effect on whether employers contracted with their employees for just
cause protection. 353 There is, however, a significant positive correlation
between a liberal jurisdiction's wrongful discharge law and the percent of
employers who contract explicitly for employment at will.354 Noting that the
purpose of a default rule is to predict how the parties would have arranged their
contractual relationship had they chosen to do so, Verkerke concludes from the
data that because most employers either contract explicitly for employment at
will or rely on the employment at will default rule, the employment at will
doctrine is the proper default rule.355
Although Verkerke attempts to answer in his article most of the arguments
in favor of a just cause requirement, neither his economic theory nor his
empirical data satisfactorily accounts for the bargaining process between the
average prospective employer and employee. Verkerke responds to arguments
in favor of just cause provisions in piecemeal fashion, ignoring the synergistic
effect of numerous factors that uphold domination of the employer's will when
347 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, in LABOR LAW
Am E EMaLOYMEr MARKEr 3, 9-11 (Richard A. Epstein & Jeffrey Paul eds., 1985).
348 See St. Antoine, supra note 343, at 271.
349 See id.
350 See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment
Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 837.
351 See id. at 865.
352 See id. at 867.
353 See id. at 867-68.
354 See id. at 868.
355 See id. at 869-75. This is a simplification of the Verkerke analysis. Verkerke makes
clear that a majoritarian default rule must take into account not only that a majority of all
market participants prefer a certain result, but also the scope of application for each default
rule. See id. at 875-79. This refinement of the rule is not relevant to my critique of
Verkerke's analysis.
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contracting with employees. Verkerke's empirical data is based on how the
workplace orders itself now, given the uneven and inadequate patchwork of
state and federal protections for employees. The use of this data assumes either
that individual potential employees will have the power to bargain with
prospective employers to reach mutually beneficial contractual arrangements or
that, absent such power, individual employees will choose to work for
employers who offer just cause protection. 356
These assumptions are flawed. A variety of factors destroy an employee's
ability to bargain freely over job security provisions. Employees often lack the
knowledge or information that the default rule is employment at will. Although
Verkerke acknowledges that asymmetry of information may occur, he argues
that his data demonstrates that such asymmetry does not affect the relationship
between employers and employees. He notes that in most workplaces all
employees have the same type of contracts. He argues that this suggests that
even the most informed employees choose not to bargain for just cause
provisions.357 Moreover, he notes that even though employees of some
industries are better informed than others, there is substantial uniformity across
industries with regard to the percentage of employers and employees who
contract for a just cause requirement. 358 This evidence suggests, according to
Verkerke, that more sophisticated employees who are knowledgeable about the
law voluntarily choose not to bargain for just cause provisions in their
contracts. 359
This conclusion does not flow inexorably from the data. Lack of
information does not exist in a vacuum. Even employees with knowledge of the
law possess less bargaining power than employers. An example that Professor
Verkerke uses to support his theory demonstrates my point. Verkerke notes that
although beginning associates in law fiins have knowledge of the employment
at will doctrine, none of the law firms in his sample offered a just cause
contract to associates. 360 From this data, Verkerke concludes that associates
voluntarily chose not to bargain for a just cause requirement. 361
This conclusion, however, ignores all of the other factors that come into
play when a potential associate negotiates with a law firm. The market for
lawyers is flooded.362 Beginning lawyers are fungible. Even students at the
356 See id. at 873-74.
357 See id. at 888-89.
358 See id.
359 See id. at 889.
360 See id.
361 See id. at 888-89.
362 See Schuyler Kropf, Lawyers Lament Bad Apples in Profession, Post & CoURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), May 5, 1996, at 1-A.
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most highly regarded law schools are often unable to find positions in law
immediately after law school.363 Students who have less impressive resumes
encounter great difficulty finding jobs.364 Despite recent exceptions to the
employment at will doctrine, the status quo in law firms' discussions with
prospective associates is not to negotiate job security, other than to discuss that
firm's policy on making associates into partners. Third year law students must
deal individually with the law firms. Most third year law students who are
fortunate enough to receive job offers are afraid to ask for a just cause
provision in their contract. Since no other law firms offer such contracts, law
students who get more than one offer cannot threaten their prospective
employer that they will work for another firn if the employer does not grant
their request for a just cause provision in their contracts. In essence, law firms
have a cartel on the issue of just cause requirements. A prospective associate's
acceptance of the status quo does not demonstrate that he voluntarily chose the
employment at will doctrine to govern his relationship with his employer.
Verkerke interprets his data as if the prospective employer and employee
actually entered into negotiations over the employment at will doctrine. This is
not the reality. Of the 52% of employers who Verkerke found explicitly
contract for the employment at will doctrine, the vast majority contract for at-
will employment through employment manuals, 365 which are normally not even
distributed until after the applicant has accepted the job. Thus, even if the
employee is aware of the employment at will doctrine, there is little opportunity
to discuss these terms before entering into a contract with the employer.
Economic theory grossly underestimates both the power an employer holds
and the difference in loss an employer and an employee will experience when
one side decides to terminate the relationship. Like new associates, the vast
majority of employees are fungible. When an employee quits, the employer can
replace her relatively easily. The employer will have to bear the expense of
searching for and training a new employee to do the job, but these costs are
built into the employee's salary structure and the cost of goods produced and
services provided by the employer.
Professor Verkerke asserts that the inequality of bargaining power
363 See America's Best Graduate Schools, U.S. NEws & WORD RLD., Mar. 18, 1996,
at 79, 82 (demonstrating that among the top 10 law schools, up to 12% of graduates did not
have jobs six months after graduation; for other law schools, up to 58% of graduates did not
have jobs after six months).
3 64 See Ann Landers, The Market Is Flooded with Would-Be Lawyers, LEDGER
(Lakeland, Fla.), Dec. 26, 1995, at D4.
365 See Verkerke, supra note 350, at 867 (stating that 61% of all employers use the
employee handbook as the contract vehicle, whereas only 12% specify discharge terms on
their employment applications).
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argument makes no economic sense. 366 He describes the bargaining power
argument as one asserting that employers will exploit their power over
employees by refusing to provide just cause provisions in contracts, even
though employees value the protection more than it would cost the employer to
provide. 367 He argues that "[e]mployers have no conceivable incentive to
impose contract terms that diminish the value of the employment
relationship." 368 Most employers, however, are unaware of the cost of
providing just cause provisions while employees are unaware of their benefits.
Verkerke never addresses this failure.
Even assuming that employers and employees had full knowledge of the
costs to the employer and the benefits to the employee of a just cause provision,
rational employers would not necessarily be motivated by cost and profits
alone. Americans tend to have a strong strain of individualism which resists
encroachment upon their rights to do as they please with their property. This
strain is evident in management's argument that it should have the freedom to
hire, fire, and promote whomever it desires for whatever reason it desires. This
individualistic strain, combined with a conservative desire to maintain the status
quo even in the presence of perfect knowledge about the costs of a just cause
contractual provision, influences an employer's use of its bargaining power
when hiring new employees.
An employee who is discharged without just cause is an innocent victim of
the employment at will doctrine. Dismissed employees suffer economic loss,
relocation costs, depression, and loss of self esteem.369 Often employees who
lose their jobs are members of two income households and are therefore unable
to relocate to take new positions. 370
The average worker finds herself in the same position as that of blacks and
women before the existence of the antidiscrimination laws. Before the state and
federal antidiscrimination laws, blacks and women were hired less frequently
for good jobs and at a lower salary. Individual women and blacks lacked the
ability to negotiate for better salaries by threatening to work for different
employers since most, if not all, employers underpaid them for their services.
Federal and state governments played an important role in attempting to correct
366 See id. at 909-12.
367 See id. at 910.
368 See id.
369 Kibok Baik et al., Correlates of Psychological Distress in Involuntary Job Loss, 65
PSYCHOL. REP. 1227 (1989); N.T. Feather & J.G. Barber, Depressive Reactions and
Unemployment, 92 J. ABNORMAL PsYCHOL. 185 (1983).
370 In the rare exception where the employee possesses equal or even greater power than
the employer, such as the case of a famous athlete, the parties can negotiate a contract of
employment that will protect the interests of the employer and the employee.
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the problem by enacting protective legislation. Similar legislation is necessary to
correct the imbalance of power between employers and average employees
today. The legislation should be narrowly tailored to protect the interests of
employees without placing an inordinate burden on employers.
As scholars have already noted, European workers have much more job
security than their counterparts in the United States. 371 In virtually every
industrialized country other than South Africa, employers must have just cause
to dismiss employees. 372 All of the other major industrialized countries have
ratified Convention No. 158 of the International Labor Organization, which
forbids employers from terminating employees without just cause.373 The
37 1 See generally EMPLOYMENT SEcuRriY LAW AND PRAcncE IN BELGIUM, BULGARIA,
FRANCE, GERMANY, GREAT BRrTAN, ITALY, JAPAN AND THE EuROPEAN COMMUNmEs
(Roger Blanpain & Tadashi Hanami eds., 1994) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT SEcurn' LAW
AND PRACTICE]. The contributors to this effort note that "employment security" can mean
many different things to different people. In a more limited sense, it means that one's job is
secure. A broader interpretation of this term is the concept of job creation and full
employment as a policy. See id. at 13. This latter interpretation is beyond the scope of this
Article.
As the economy has declined in European countries and Japan, labor lawyers in those
countries have reported increased age and sex discrimination. See id. at 37-38. Any proposal
to grant job security in this country would have to take this phenomenon into account and
guard against it. See also Madeleine M. Plasencia, Employment at Will: The French
Experience as a Basisfor Reform, 9 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 294 (1988).372 See Plasencia, supra note 371, at 316.
373The International Labor Organization ("ILO"), an organization established in 1919
which aims to promote social justice, has a tripartite structure, composed of representatives of
governments and of workers' and employers' organizations. [Codex] R. BLANPAIN & C.
ENGELS, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
ILO-11 (1994). Approximately 150 nations are members of the organization. See id. The ILO
has three main bodies: the International Labour Conference ("Conference"), the Governing
Body and the International Labour Office. See id. The Conference acts as an international
legislature, consisting of national delegations, each of which includes government, employer,
and worker delegates. The Conference adopts conventions and recommendations by a two-
thirds majority of the delegates. Member states of the ILO are obligated by the adoption of the
Conventions and Recommendations to submit them to the legislature or other competent
authority in their nation and to supply to the Conference reports as to whether their respective
nations have ratified the Conventions and Recommendations. Once a member ratifies a
Convention by registering with the Director-General of the ILO, the Convention is binding on
that member. A member that does not ratify the Convention is not bound by it. See ILO
CONSTrrUTION, reprinted in BLANPArN & Ei4GELS, supra, at ILO-1 1-21.
In 1982, the ILO adopted Convention 158 covering termination of employees. See ILO
CONVENT[ON 158, reprinted in BLANPAIN & ENGELS, supra, at ILO-343-54. Article 4 of this
Convention forbids employers from terminating employees "unless there is a valid reason for
such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the
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United States, however, was the only member nation whose government
representatives opposed Convention No. 158.374 Evidently, the United States
opposed the Convention because it would erode the employment at will
operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service." Id. Part I, Div. A,
Art. 4, reprinted in BLANPAIN & ENGELS, supra, at ILO-344--50. Although the Convention
applies generally to all employees, it permits member states to exempt workers with contracts
for specified time periods, workers on periods of probation, and workers engaged on a casual
basis for a short period. See id. Part I, Art. 2, 2(a)-(c), reprinted in BLANPAiN & ENGELS,
supra, at ILO-343. The Convention specifically excludes from the definition of "valid
reason," firing on the basis of the employee's seeking office, union membership, race, color,
sex, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national
extraction, social origin, absence from work during maternity leave, temporary absence from
work due to illness or injury. See id. Part II. Div. A, Arts. 5, 6, reprinted in BLANPAN &
ENGELS, supra, at ILO-344-51. A worker who believes he has been terminated in violation of
the Convention has the right to bring an "appeal" to an impartial body, which can include a
labor tribunal, an arbitration panel, a court or an arbitrator. See id. Part II, Div. C, Art. 8,
reprinted in BLANPAN & ENGELS, supra, at ILO-351. Either the employer bears the burden
of proving that the termination was justified or the body hearing the case "shall be
empowered to reach a conclusion on the reason for the termination having regard to evidence
provided by the parties and according to procedures provided for by national law and
practice." Id. Part II, Div. C, Art. 9, 2(a)-(b), reprinted in BLANPAIN & ENGELS, supra, at
ILO-351-52. If it finds that the termination is unjustified, the body hearing the appeal shall
declare the termination invalid and may order reinstatement or shall order payment of
adequate compensation or other relief deemed appropriate. See id. Part II, Div. C Art. 10,
reprinted in BLANPAM & ENGELS, supra, at LO-352.
A worker whose employment is terminated is entitled in accordance with national law
and practice to severance pay or other separation benefits or unemployment insurance. See id.
Part II, Div. E, Art. 12, reprinted in BLANPAIN & ENGELS, supra, at LO-352-53.
Convention 158 also requires employers who are terminating employees for economic,
technological, structural, or similar reasons to provide to the workers representative notice of
the terminations, with the reasons for the termination contemplated, the number and
categories of workers likely to be affected and the period over which the terminations will
occur, and to give the representative an opportunity for consultation on measures to be taken
to avert or minimize terminations, in accordance with national law and practice. See id. Part
Im, Div. A, Art. 13, reprinted in BLANPAIN & ENGELS, supra, at LO-353. It also requires
the employer to notify the competent authority in accordance with national law. See id. Part
III Div. B., Art. 14, reprinted in BLANPAiN & ENGELS, supra, at ILO-353-54.
Only seven member states had representatives who voted against the adoption of
Convention 158. See Plasencia, supra note 370, at 316 n.199. Of the seven, the United States
was the only country whose government representatives opposed the Convention. See id.
(citing ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE CONVE ON CONCERMG
TERmNATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT Tim INrmTivn oF THE EMPLOYER, 68th Sess. ILO
Convention, No. 158 (1982)).
374 See Plasencia, supra note 371, at 316 n.199.
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doctrine. 375 The United States feared that American companies with
subsidiaries abroad would have to comply with the Convention. Interestingly,
even though American companies with subsidiaries abroad have had to comply
with the labor law in the countries where the subsidiaries are located, 376
American companies operate large numbers of subsidiaries in France and Great
Britain.377 The European laws do not seem to have affected the productivity of
these companies. 378
B. Statutory Exceptions: Montana, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico
Even though scholars in this country have urged the courts and legislatures
to increase job security, no court has ever abolished the employment at will
doctrine. Only Montana, 379 the Virgin Islands, 380 and Puerto Rico 381 have done
375 See id. at 317 n.202.
376 See id. at 318.
377 See id.
378 See infra notes 429-45 and accompanying text.
379 The Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act ("Montana Act") seems
designed to protect the interests of business rather than those of employees. According to the
Montana Act, a discharge is wrongful only if:
(1) it was in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate public policy or for
reporting a violation of public policy; or
(2) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the
employer's probationary period of employment; or
(3) the employer violated the express provisions of its own written personnel
policy.
MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (1993).
The Montana Act defines "good cause" as "reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal
based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer's operation,
or other legitimate business reason." MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (1993). The Montana
Supreme Court has interpreted "legitimate business reason" broadly. See Buck v. Billings
Mont. Chevrolet, 811 P.2d 537, 541 (Mont. 1991) (interpreting legitimate business reason to
include a desire of an acquiring company to place its own person in an upper echelon job even
though the person replaced was an exemplary employee).
The Montana Act preempts all common law causes of action for discharge arising from
tort, express contract, or implied contract. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-913. A prevailing
plaintiff under the Montana Act may collect lost wages and fringe benefits for a period not to
exceed four years from the date of discharge. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1). Punitive
damages are available if the employee can show by clear and convincing evidence that the
employer engaged in actual fraud or actual malice in the discharge of an employee in violation
of public policy. See MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(2). This is an extremely narrow set of
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circumstances under which punitive damages can be awarded. The Montana Act exempts
causes of action covered by federal and state discrimination statutes. See MoNT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-912(1), and persons covered by a collective bargaining agreement. See MoNT. CODE
ANN. § 39-2-912(2).
There is no fee shifting provision in favor of plaintiffs, and the plaintiff has the burden of
proving a lack of good cause or other reason for a wrongful discharge. Because there is no fee
shifing provision, because recovery is limited to a maximum of four years' salary, and
because the plaintiff has a duty to mitigate his damages, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-
905(1), finding attorneys to take these cases may create serious problems for discharged
employees.
The Montana Act was passed primarily as a result of pressure from the defense bar
because of the liberal decisions by the Montana Supreme Court that granted employees'
rights. See LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful
Discharge From Employment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L. REv. 94, 108 (1990).
But the Montana Act does give some protections to employees who otherwise may not be
protected. See id. at 95.
380 In 1986 the Virgin Islands passed the Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act
("Virgin Islands Act"), V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 76-79 (1993), which abolishes the
employment at will doctrine in the Virgin Islands. The Virgin Islands Act sets up the
permissible reasons for discharging an employee. Under the Virgin Islands Act, employers
can discharge an employee for:
(1) conflicts of interest;
(2) offensive conduct toward a customer;
(3) using controlled substances or alcohol which interferes with his or her
work;
(4) willfully and intentionally disobeying reasonable work rules;
(5) negligently performing work;
(6) continuous absence;
(7) incompetence or inefficiency;
(8) dishonesty;
(9) offensive conduct causing other employees to refuse to work with him; or
(10) engaging in unprotected concerted activity.
Id. §76.
The Virgin Islands Act also permits an employer to terminate employees if the business
closes or if there is a general cutback due to economic hardship. See id. § 76.
If the employee is discharged for any reasons other than the permissible reasons
described in the statute, the employer's action constitutes wrongful discharge. See id. A fired
employee can file a written complaint with the Commissioner of the Department of Labor
within 30 days of the discharge, see id. § 77(a), who holds a hearing within 10 days of service
of the complaint. See id. § 77(b). Upon a finding of wrongful discharge, the Commissioner
orders reinstatement with back pay. See id. § 77(c). The Commissioner may request the
Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands to enforce the Commissioner's order. The Territorial
Court considers the findings of fact of the Commissioner conclusive if there is substantial
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so by statute. Of these three statutes, only the Virgin Islands' law is
evidence on the record considered as a whole to support them. The court can enforce the
order, modify it, or set it aside. See id. § 78.
Additionally, the Virgin Islands Act provides that an employee may bring in any court of
competent jurisdiction an action for compensatory and punitive damages stemming from the
wrongful discharge. If the plaintiff prevails, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees
and costs to the plaintiff. See id. § 79. The Virgin Islands Act does not require the exhaustion
of administrative remedies before bringing the action in court. Hess Oil V.I. v. Richardson,
10 IER Cases (BNA) 1360 (V.I. June 20, 1995).
Plaintiffs have a number of options under the statute. They can bring the administrative
complaint before the Department of Labor and go into court after the proceeding, or they can
go directly to the court under § 79 to seek compensatory and punitive damages. See V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 77-79 (1993). The benefit of going through the administrative process
is that if the employee wins his complaint, he should be reinstated with back pay within a
relatively short time after his discharge. He then has the luxury of pursuing an action in court.
Should the employee not desire to return to the workplace because of ill feelings or a hostile
environment, he or she can choose to go directly to court to pursue his or her claim for
compensatory and punitive damages. See id. § 79.
The Virgin Islands Act has a particularly interesting structure because by setting up the
Department of Labor hearings within 40 days of the discharge, it focuses on returning
wrongfully discharged employees to work expeditiously, but it does not sacrifice the
possibility of collecting damages from the employer for its wrongful act.
This law is much more protective than the Montana statute because it protects the
employee's property right to the job without sacrificing his or her right to sue in court to
redress his loss of dignity. Also, the fee shifting provision should enable plaintiffs to obtain
counsel more readily.
381 The wrongful discharge statute in Puerto Rico provides less protection for the
average worker suffering from wrongful discharge. Generally, it provides that an employee
fired without just cause can collect one month's salary plus one week's pay for each year of
service. See P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 29, § 185a (1995). "Just cause" includes: a pattern of
improper or disorderly conduct; inefficient or negligent work standards; repeated violations of
reasonable rules; partial or full, permanent or temporary closing of the business; technological
or reorganizational changes; changes in product make or services rendered; and reductions in
force. See id. § 185b. There is no right to back pay, reinstatement, compensatory damages or
attorney's fees.
There is one exception to this provision. Employees fired for offering oral or written
testimony or an "expression or information before a legislative, administrative or judicial
forum in Puerto Rico" can bring a civil action in court for back pay, benefits, compensatory
damages, reinstatement, and attorney's fees. See id. § 194a. This expression does not have to
relate to the employer's business for protection. Act No. 115, S.B. No. 987, 11th Leg., 1991
P.R. LAws Act 115 (S.B. No. 987) (Statement of motives) (West, WESTLAW through
portions of 1994 legislation). The only limitation is that an employer can legally discharge an
employee for a defamatory statement or for disclosing privileged information protected by
law. See P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 29 § 194a (1995).
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substantially protective of the employee's rights. 382
C. The Model Uniform Employment Termination Act
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved the final version of the Model Uniform Employment Termination Act
("Model Act") on August 8, 1991.383 Since the approval of the Model Act in
1991, although ten states have introduced bills based on the Model Act, not one
state has adopted it.384
Generally, the Model Act abrogates the employment at will doctrine,
permitting employers to dismiss employees only for good cause. 385 It grants a
dismissed employee the right to file a complaint with a state commission or
agency. 386 Under the Model Act, a state commission has the responsibility to
adopt rules and regulate procedures, to appoint the arbitrators, and to delegate
as necessary the day to day operational functions to private agencies, such as
the American Arbitration Society.387 The Model Act defines "good cause" as
"a reasonable basis ... in view of relevant factors and circumstances, which
may include the employee's duties, responsibilities, conduct on the job or
otherwise, job performance and employment record," or a good faith exercise
of business judgment.388 The "good faith" exercise of business judgment
exception permits employers to reorganize, discontinue operations or positions,
downsize, and change standards of performance for particular positions without
a finding of liability.3 89
Although authors of the Model Act worked assiduously to produce an act
382 See supra note 380.
383 See MODEL UNIFORM EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACr, reprinted in 9A Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 540:21 (Aug. 8, 1991) [hereinafter METAl. A motion to approve the draft as a
uniform law (rather than a model law) was defeated by a vote of 29 to 21. Approval of the
draft as a uniform law would have required the commissioners to have a uniform measure
introduced in each state legislature. The Model Act, although it fell short of becoming a
uniform act, provides a guide to state legislatures.
384 The Model Act was introduced but rejected in the following states: 1992-Delaware
(H.B. 293); Hawaii (H.B. 177); Iowa (S.B. 2158); Maine (L.D. 351); Massachusetts (I.B.
1452); Oklahoma (H.B. 1057); Pennsylvania (H.B. 2154); 1993-Massachusetts; Nevada
(A.B. 343); New Hampshire (H.B. 513); 1994-Oklahoma (S.B. 609); 1995-Hawaii (H.B.
355); 1996-Hawaii (H.B. 353, S.B. 1226), Rhode Island. Information provided by the
legislative assistant of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
385 See META § 3.
386 See id. § 5.387 See id. § 6 and § 6 cmt.
388 Id. § 1(4).
389 See id.
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that would eliminate the employment at will doctrine, 39 and the Model Act
includes some important protections for employees, it is unacceptable to
employees. If a state were to adopt the Model Act, the combined effects of a
series of pro-business provisions would do serious damage to the rights
employees now possess, without giving them enough in return. For example,
the Model Act places the burden on the employee to prove that the employer
lacked good cause to fire him.391 This allocation of the burden places the
procedural disadvantage on the party with fewer resources and less access to
the information he needs to meet the burden.
Moreover, the Model Act extinguishes all common law rights of a
terminated employee against the employer or its agents "which are based on the
termination or on acts taken or statements made that are reasonably necessary
to initiate or effect the termination." 392 This section would eliminate most
causes of action based on intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation, among others. 393 While this section was necessary in order to gain
the support of business, it provides an extraordinary benefit to the employer
given the limited benefit the employee gains from the Model Act.
Possibly the most precarious provision to employees' rights is the waiver
provision. The Model Act permits employers and employees to "agree" to
waive the good cause requirement if, in the absence of the employee's willful
misconduct, the employer agrees to pay severance pay in an amount equal to
one month's pay for each year the employee has worked for the company, up
to a maximum of thirty months' pay. 394 This waiver provision places a heavy
burden on employees. It permits the employer, the party with the greater
bargaining power at the time of entering the contract of employment, to insist
upon a waiver as a condition of working for the employer,395 and to terminate
390 The Model Act was authored by some of the best minds in the area of employment
law, many of whom have spent years arguing for greater rights for workers. The Reporter for
the Committee, Professor Theodore J. St. Antoine of the University of Michigan Law School,
was at the forefront, arguing for the abolition of the employment at will doctrine. I am aware
that these eminent scholars and practitioners had to compromise with the business community
to arrive at a Model Act that would be approved by the National Conference, and I know that
no one else could have done a better job of authoring the Model Act.
391 See MErA § 6(e).
392 See id. § 2(c).
393 See id. § 2 and § 2 cmt. (c).
394 See id. § 4(c).
395 The comment on this section by the National Conference of Commissioners states:
"It is the intent of Section 4 not to allow so-called 'contracts of adhesion' to be used to waive
or otherwise circumvent employees' rights under the Act." Id. § 4 cmt. This comment, while
giving employees an argument that the employer's contract was one of adhesion, does not
adequately protect employees against employer power. See generally Stempel, supra note
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an employee before her right to a sizable severance pay accrues. 396 The waiver
provision is particularly burdensome on employees given that if the employee
"agrees" to sign the waiver, he also agrees to waive the right to bring common
law causes of action arising from the discharge.
The greatest downfall of the Model Act, however, is the concept behind the
Model Act itself. By its very essence, a model act relies on state by state
adoption. It will necessarily give too much power to the interests of the business
community. Business will exercise this power on two fronts. First, in the
drafting of the model statute, business representatives will demand
compromises from those who have the interest of employees at heart. Because
business negotiates from the more powerful position-the employment at will
doctrine is still alive and well-business will have the power to demand
compromises that result in a greater benefit for business. Business will agree to
provisions in the Model Act only to the extent the result will be an
improvement for business. The Model Act is, in part, a result of these
compromises.
The second front is the debate in the individual states themselves. Because
the individual states compete with one another to attract business, it is nearly
impossible politically to get individual states to pass legislation that would be
adverse to the perceived interests of the business community. Thus, even if a
legislator introduces a bill containing the Model Act or its equivalent into the
state legislature, which I contend is already too favorable to business interests, it
is highly likely that the bill will be diluted even further to attract the support of
the business community.
Of course, if employees were totally powerless, business would not
compromise at all. The power employees possess is the right to bring lawsuits
based on wrongful discharge and other tort actions. This employee power can
harm business in a number of ways. First, business will have to pay direct397
and indirect398 costs to defend the lawsuits, whether they win them or not.
197; Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TuLAE L. REv. 1377,
1413-14 (1991). Given the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, it would be surprising if
employees could win these arguments. See supra Part II.C.3.
396 Another provision in the Model Act confirms my judgment that this is the course that
many employers would take. Section 14 permits an employer to impose on employees, as a
condition of continued employment, the requirement that they enter into agreements to waive
their rights under § 4(c) of the Model Act. If the employees refuse to sign, the employer can
terminate them within six months after the effective date of the Model Act without any
penalty. META § 14.
397 "Direct costs" are attorney's fees and costs of the litigation.
398 "Indirect costs" include the loss of employee time and productivity caused by
protracted litigation. They could be extremely high. According to the authors of the Model
Act, indirect effects of wrongful termination doctrines are 100 times as costly as the direct
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Second, business will have to pay damages to prevailing plaintiffs or at least
high insurance premiums to pay for its torts. Finally, the cost to business is
somewhat unpredictable. The lack of predictability may be a cost in itself.
As the history of the Model Act demonstrates, however, this employee
power alone is not sufficient to overcome the enormous strength business brings
to the table. Individual employees lack a powerful group of representatives to
negotiate on behalf of their interests. When individual employees lack union
affiliation, the unions will not represent their interests in the process. Plaintiffs'
attorneys, who often collect large sums representing individual employees, have
economic interests that diverge from those of the vast majority of employees.
Moreover, even if employees at the state level have powerful groups to
represent them, they cannot offer enough to employers to make it worth a
compromise by business. A model act which necessarily addresses the problem
at the state rather than the national level cannot include the federal
antidiscrimination statutes in its purview. Because the Model Act cannot bring
the antidiscrimination statutes to the negotiating table, employees lose their most
powerful bargaining tool. Employees also lose their most powerful potential
ally: the civil rights community. It may seem odd to consider the civil rights
community as a potential ally that would agree to negotiate away the discharge
portions of the federal antidiscrimination law, but I believe that the civil rights
community needs to consider doing exactly that. I have documented above in
Part II the expense of bringing antidiscrimination claims and the courts' poor
enforcement of plaintiffs' civil rights. It appears that it is time to negotiate with
business for a federal statute that would protect the rights of all employees
against wrongful discharge. With the rights arising from the discharge
components of Title VII and the ADEA as well as state antidiscrimination
statutes and common law causes of action on the negotiating table, employees
will have more substantive power. They should also have the force of the
powerful civil rights lobby behind them. Finally, because this is federal rather
than state legislation, business will lose its power to threaten to move to another
state in order to avoid the legislation.
IV. AN OMNIBus FEDERAL "JUST CAUSE" EMPLOYMENT STATUTE
A proposal for change should address the causes of the decline of civil
rights in employment while also accommodating workers not protected by the
civil rights statutes. The proposal should remove a substantial number of cases
from the federal judiciary; the federal judiciary's conservative ideology and the
pressure from crowded dockets to decide cases quickly make the federal courts
costs of awards, settlements, and attorney's fees. See META, Prefatory Note.
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an undesirable forum for employees. It should shift the burden of persuasion to
the employer, eliminating the problems of inadequate proof evident in St.
Mary's. It should refocus the inquiry from the employer's intent to the ultimate
question of whether the employer actually discriminated, consciously or
subconsciously. It should abolish the employment at will doctrine, eliminating
the refuge the courts found in the doctrine in St. Mary's399 and Visser.4°°
Finally, it should cover all employees, both those who are currently members
of the protected classes and those who are not, avoiding a backlash from
unprotected workers against protected workers.
Given these standards, a number of the potential remedies to the decline in
enforcement of employment discrimination laws are too limited; they would
likely repeat the problems discrimination victims have encountered in the past.
For example, federal legislation that would reverse St. Mary's and Gilmer is not
optimal. It would fail to change the ideology of a conservative judiciary or to
relieve the pressure on federal courts overburdened by crowded dockets. Given
the Supreme Court's tendency since 1989401 to cut back on the rights of
employment discrimination plaintiffs, and the lower courts' willingness to grant
summary judgment in inappropriate cases even in the face of the 1991 Act, 4°2
which was passed to enhance civil rights, this solution would likely fail.
Moreover, this limited solution would do nothing to shift the burden of
persuasion or to eliminate the intent requirement,40 3 and would continue to
permit the employment at will doctrine to undermine a potential plaintiff's suit.
It would do nothing to eliminate the backlash by unprotected workers.
Another possible solution would be to write model rules creating an
arbitration system for employees who sign predispute arbitration clauses that
399 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); see discussion supra Part
II.C.2.
400 Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see
discussion supra notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
401 In the summer of 1989, the Supreme Court decided a number of cases that
threatened the protections afforded employees by the civil rights laws. See cases cited supra
note 248. The 1991 Act was passed, in part, to reverse those decisions. See McGinley, supra
note 4, at 203-06.
402 See generally Ann C. McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion of
After-Acquired Evidence in itle VI Litigation, 26 CONN. L. REv. 145 (1993); McGinley,
supra note 4.
403 Federal legislation overturning St. Mary's and Gilner could shift the burdens of
persuasion and eliminate proof of discriminatory intent. Such legislation, if it could ever pass,
would go a long way toward correcting the problems evident in civil rights enforcement. But
even this legislation, which I believe would be very difficult to sell politically, would not
avoid a backlash by unprotected workers.
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are as protective as possible of plaintiffs' civil rights.40 4 This is an attractive
possibility because it would not require legislation on the federal level.
However, as noted in Part II.C.3 above, there is a question whether any
predispute agreement to arbitrate can be knowing and voluntary. Moreover,
although a model of arbitration that is built on the current system would
presumably relieve some of the docket pressure on the federal courts, it would
do nothing to change the conservative ideology of federal judges. With
arbitration of employment discrimination discharge disputes coexisting with
adjudication of the same type of disputes in court, the protection granted by the
arbitrators will, at best, reflect the federal courts' interpretation of the civil
rights acts. To the extent that the federal courts misinterpret the law, the
arbitrators will likely follow suit.
A further weakness of this solution is that it does nothing to prevent the
distortion of civil rights law through hypertechnical adherence to the
employment at will doctrine, the plaintiff's burden of proof, and the
requirement of discriminatory intent. Neither does it destroy the forces leading
to a backlash from unprotected workers. Thus, a mere attempt to duplicate the
federal forum in arbitration, except for its expensive and timely procedures, is
an inadequate solution to a multifaceted problem.40 5
Another question is whether a federal statute or a series of state statutes can
better accomplish the goals enumerated above. Although there has been much
concern about the "federalization of state law," most of the issues concerning
federalization of state law are not present here. First, civil rights has always
been the province of federal statutory law. Second, the statute I propose here
would reduce rather than increase the burden on the federal courts because it
would divert to arbitration the discharge cases of plaintiffs who may have
otherwise sued under Title VII, the ADEA and other federal acts.406
I propose federal legislation4 7 similar to that in the Virgin Islands,40 8
forbidding dismissal without just cause of all employees who have finished a
probationary period. This is a radical change to the present system because it
404 This is happening spontaneously. For example, The Association of the Bar of the
City of New York has at least one group working on this issue: the Committee on Labor and
Employment Law. See Final Report, supra note 232.
405 The New York Model Rules fail for all of these reasons. See supra note 232.
406 Moreover, in order to avoid giving some states an undue advantage attracting
industry over others, there needs to be uniformity in the law.
407 Because a just cause provision would "substantially affect" interstate commerce, it
seems that Congress would have the constitutional authority to pass this type of legislation.
Cf United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995) (using the commerce clause to
strike down the constitutionality of federal legislation that made it a crime to possess a firearm
near a school because the law did not substantially affect interstate commerce).
40 8 See supra note 380.
1996]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
would extinguish all rights of individual plaintiffs alleging discriminatory
discharge under Title VII, the ADEA, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, while
creating new rights for all employees to maintain their jobs in the absence of
just cause. Although the drafting of the provisions of the statute is beyond the
scope of this Article, I will outline my proposed solution.
The statute should require arbitration of the plaintiff's wrongful discharge
claim.40 9 Arbitration when properly focused can provide a fair and speedy
resolution of the employment dispute, returning the employee to work, where
appropriate, in a relatively short time.410 A speedy resolution favors the
4 0 9 This proposal would replace the discharge portions only of Title VII, the ADEA,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and it would preempt discharge portions of state and local human
rights statutes. At this point, because the ADA requires much different proof, I do not
envision this model to encompass ADA suits. It would also be impossible to apply this
scheme to failure to hire cases under Title VII, the ADEA, or § 1981. If it were to apply to
failure to hire cases, every disappointed job applicant would bring an arbitration requiring the
employer to justify its decision. This result would be unmanageable and harmful to
management's interests. Instead, I would continue Title VII and the ADEA as they are for
failure to hire cases, permitting the EEOC or other organizations to bring systemic disparate
treatment and disparate impact suits using testers. See Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an
Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for
Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403 (1993); Leroy D. Clark,
Employment Discrimination Testing: Theories of Standing and a Reply to Professor Yelnosky,
28 U. MIcH. J.L. REFoRM 1 (1994); Michael J. Yelnosky, Salvaging the Opportunity: A
Response to Professor Clark, 28 U. MIcH. J. L. REFORM 151 (1994).
4 10 An alternative to arbitration would be specialized labor courts. These federal labor
courts would be similar to bankruptcy courts in that the judges selected for the courts would
have a specialized knowledge in the areas of labor, employment, and antidiscrimination law.
They would have the authority to decide cases, which would be appealable to the federal
district courts. The appeals would be limited to the questions of whether the labor courts
interpreted the law incorrectly or made findings of fact that had no basis in the evidence.
These specialized courts would be similar to the industrial tribunals in England that have
jurisdiction over discharge matters. See Glen D. Newman, The Model Employment
Termination Act in the United States: Lessons from the British Experience with Uniform
Protections Against Unfair Dismissal, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 393, 417-18 (1991). This system,
however, would have its weaknesses. In England, for example, discharged employees have a
very low rate of success before industrial tribunals. See id. at 420-21. In 1981, for example,
industrial tribunals decided approximately 23 % of the cases in favor of the employee. See id.
at 430. Between 1978 and 1982, fewer than 30% of the plaintiffs prevailed. See id.
Moreover, in 1981, only 1.1% of all complainants who brought their cases before the
industrial tribunals were awarded reinstatement. See id. At least one scholar attributes this
low rate of success to the tribunal's deference to the employer's discharge decision and the
tactical advantage an employer has over an unrepresented employee at the tribunal. See id.
Glen Newman believes that arbitration panels in the United States may be more evenhanded
in deciding labor disputes. See id. at 432.
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employer as well as the employee, permitting both parties to plan for their
futures and to avoid the high cost of extensive litigation.41' The panel of
arbitrators should have experience in labor arbitration412 and in civil rights law.
The statute would place the burden of persuasion on the employer because
the employer has exclusive control over the information to prove his case. The
employer's burden is to prove two essential elements: (1) just cause for firing
the employee, and (2) that the just cause was the actual cause for the
411 In an attempt to protect employers from an overwhelming number of arbitrations, I
am not including discipline that falls short of discharge in my proposal. Persons who are
disciplined unfairly due to their membership in a protected class can still bring a lawsuit in
federal or state court to redress their dignity rights to the extent the discipline rises to the level
of discriminatory treatment or harassment.
4 12 Labor arbitrators have experience deciding whether just cause for firing exists.
Although most labor contracts do not define "just cause," there has emerged in labor law a
common law of interpreting just cause provisions that may be useful in this context. In
determining whether just cause exists, labor arbitrators use their judgment and discretion. In
using their discretion they begin by asking seven questions:
1. Did the employee have forewarning of the possible consequences of the employee's
conduct?
2. Did the company's rule or managerial order allegedly violated by the employee relate to the
orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the employer's business and was it related to the
performance that the company might reasonably expect of the employee?
3. Did the company, before discharging the employee, make an effort to find out whether the
employee violated the rule or order?
4. Was the company's investigation conducted fairly?
5. At the company investigation, did the judge have substantial proof of a violation?
6. Did the company apply its rules evenhandedly to all employees without discrimination?
7. Was the discharge reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and to the record of
the employee in service to the company?
See MARViN HiLL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SiNmROpI, REm iEs iN ARBrrR TON 139-40 (1991).
If the answer to any of these questions is "no," the discharge will typically not be backed
by "just cause."
Because I am proposing a scheme that would protect managerial employees as well as
workers typically covered by union contracts, the formulation of the standard might differ
slightly. However, these seven questions are very adaptable. Because they take into account
the very issue of discriminatory treatment, labor arbitrators may be well suited to decide
whether just cause exists, so long as they are cognizant of the civil rights in employment laws
and subtle forms of discrimination. This is the reason I suggest that the arbitration panel have
experience in both labor law and employment discrimination law.
My suggestion that labor arbitrators should decide wrongful discharge disputes is not
new. Professor Clyde Summers first suggested the use of labor arbitrators to resolve
employment disputes between employers and non-union employees who are discharged. See
Summers, supra note 9.
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discharge.413
"Just cause" would include any cause that would protect an employer's
legitimate business interests, including, employee misconduct, incompetence,
and repeated lateness. In order to maintain its burden, the employer would have
to prove that it treated other employees similarly. Unless the employee's
conduct was egregious, such as a physical attack on a coworker, the employer
would also have to prove that it gave the employee notice of the company rules
or policy and a warning to discontinue his behavior.
As a defense to the employer's proof, the employee could cross-examine
the employer or present evidence on the issue of causation. For example, an
employee could rebut the employer's showing by cross-examining the witness
or presenting evidence tending to show that there was no just cause, or that the
employer's alleged reason for the discharge was not the real reason for the
discharge. Where appropriate, this evidence could include direct evidence of
discrimination or evidence of discriminatory remarks, or differential treatment
of similarly situated persons who were not members of the protected class. This
evidence would not focus on the employer's intent, but rather on the
employer's behavior in dealing with members and nonmembers of protected
classes.
The burden of persuasion is always on the employer. Therefore, the
employee does not have to present any evidence if the employer's story does
not reach the preponderance of the evidence standard.414 If the employer's
evidence presents a prima facie case,415 the burden of going forward shifts to
the employee to present evidence. Once introduced, this evidence would shift
the burden of production once more to the employer to prove that it treated
other employees similarly.
In order to save time and the parties' finances, the statute should require the
employer and the employee to exchange relevant information and documents
413 Typically in labor arbitrations, it is the employer's burden to prove just cause for the
discipline imposed. However, many arbitrators look to see merely if just cause exists, not
whether the cause given was the actual cause of the dismissal. My scheme would not permit
the use of after-acquired evidence to justify a dismissal. See McGinley, supra note 402, at
172-75.
In France, the just cause requirement requires the judges to find the actual existence of
the alleged fact which constituted cause for dismissal as well as the fact that the cause alleged
is the true reason for the dismissal at the time of the dismissal. See Jacques Rojot, France, in
EMPLOYMENT SECURriY LAW AND PRAcncE, supra note 371, at 111, 118.
414 Although in many labor cases, the standard required of an employer is higher than
the preponderance of the evidence, this standard should be adequate to protect the employee's
interests without making it too difficult for employers to prove just cause where it exists.
415 1 use the term "prima facie case" in the traditional evidentiary sense, not in the way
it is commonly used in Title VII litigation. See McGinley, supra note 4, at 215 n.47.
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before the arbitration. The legislation should require the employer to keep
certain types of records that would contain the most relevant information for
lawsuits. Most of these records would be those that are already prepared by
employers either by law or voluntarily. For example, employers would be
responsible for keeping a file on each individual employee with the employee's
salary history and performance reviews. Each employee should have the right
to examine his or her own personnel file. Furthermore, the employer would be
required to keep demographic information concerning its workforce that may
be relevant to rebut the employer's proof of just cause. This information, too,
must be kept publicly and shared with the employee who alleges a wrongful
discharge. These simple requirements will substantially reduce the time and cost
of discovery.
This proposal would cover all wrongful discharge cases brought by
employees who have passed the probationary period of employment. It would
cover employees who today would not have a cause of action under the federal
antidiscrimination suits as well as those who today would allege a violation of
federal or state employment discrimination statutes. 416 Arbitration would
resolve the property rights dispute. Because it would resolve disputes between
the employer and the employee more quickly, arbitration would be a less costly
alternative and would provide a realistic opportunity to reinstate a wrongfully
discharged employee.
The arbitrators would have the power to reinstate and to grant back pay for
the lost property right. Employees and employers would have the right to be
represented by counsel at the arbitration proceedings. The arbitrators should
award attorney's fees and costs to the employee if the employee prevails.
An employer's potential advantage as a "repeat player" who regularly
submits its cases to the arbitrators can be overcome. Attorneys representing
employees before arbitration panels will establish specialties in the area and will
become acquainted very quickly with the habits of members of the arbitration
panels. Moreover, in the event that certain employees cannot afford attorneys
or do not want representation, the law should specify that each place of
employment whose employees are not represented by a union should have
employee representatives who can advise clients in a confidential manner and
represent them before the arbitration panels. These employee representatives
would be lay advocates who would be aware of the law and of the particular
quirks of the members of the arbitration panels. Any information gained by
counseling fellow employees would be privileged and unreachable by the
employer.
Both parties could appeal the panel's decision to the federal district court.
4 16 It would also cover all discriminatory discharge suits brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1994).
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In the event that the arbitrators misinterpreted the law or made findings of fact
that had no basis in the evidence, the district court would reverse the
arbitrators' decision.417 This system of appeals should help to avoid inconsistent
rulings concerning the applicable law. It should also correct the most egregious
factual errors made by arbitration panels without placing an undue burden on
the federal courts.
Employees alleging both a property loss and a loss of dignity would have
two options: (1) they could go to arbitration to resolve their property loss claims
and later bring their dignity loss claims in federal418 or state court, or (2) they
could forego reinstatement and back pay and go directly to the state or federal
court to redress their dignity rights. 419
If the employee chooses the first option and goes to arbitration alleging
wrongful discharge, the arbitrator's decision, if it relates to the question of
harassment, defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, will not
be binding on the jury, but may be considered by the jury as evidence. 420 If a
plaintiff can claim common law violations such as defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, battery, and false imprisonment exclusively, he
or she would bring these claims in state court rather than federal court. If the
claim is based on sexual or racial harassment, the plaintiff would have the
option of bringing the claim in state or federal court as she has today. In court,
the litigant would have the right to a jury trial and the court would have the
power to award compensatory and punitive damages. 421 If the court finds that
sexual or racial harassment took place, the court would award attorney's fees
417 To avoid a burden on the federal district court, the district court would likely assign
the appeals to United States magistrates to write reports and recommendations to be submitted
to the district court judges for approval. Each district could appoint a number of magistrates
with experience in labor and employment law to cover these appeals.
418 1 would limit the dignity loss claims to be brought in federal court to sexual or racial
harassment, over which the federal courts already have jurisdiction through Title VII, because
of the important national policy of guaranteeing equality of all persons before the law,
regardless of sex or race.
419 1 would not require plaintiffs to file charges with the EEOC because the EEOC
involvement merely delays the proceedings. See supra Part II.B.
420 This is similar to the treatment of an EEOC determination that there is no probable
cause. See, e.g., Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 650-51 (1lth Cir. 1990) (holding
an EEOC determination of probable cause admissible in both jury and nonjury trials);
McClure v. Mexia Indep. Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding EEOC
finding admissible but not binding on the jury); compare Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir. 1984) (admissibility within discretion of trial judge).
421 1 would not place a cap on the compensatory or punitive damages permitted by the
statute for harassment.
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and costs. 422
In causes of action for a loss of dignity rights at the workplace, the
employee will continue to have the burden of persuasion because, unlike in the
property loss cases, there is usually direct evidence to support claims of
harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.
This scheme will not enhance or reduce the employee's rights or change
the order or burden of proof in cases alleging a loss of dignity. For the cases
where the employee is alleging a wrongful loss of property right, however, the
scheme enhances the employee's rights and changes the order and burden of
proof. It eliminates the employment at will doctrine, broadening the property
right to a job; for those cases that currently would be brought under Title VII or
state employment discrimination statutes, it eliminates proof of intentional
discrimination and shifts the burden to the employer to prove that it had just
cause to dismiss the employee.
This system gives something to both management and workers.
Management benefits because more employment disputes will be resolved in
arbitration, a quicker, less expensive option than litigation in court. Workers
benefit because the system converts their expectations of industrial justice into
law. Workers who otherwise would not have a wrongful discharge claim can
bring a claim before an arbitration panel which will determine whether the
employer had just cause for firing the employee.
Furthermore, the scheme avoids most of the problems in the enforcement
of the employment discrimination statutes without sacrificing civil rights in
employment. By broadening the property right to one requiring an employer to
have a just cause for dismissal, the scheme avoids pitting workers against one
another, eliminating the present backlash against the employment discrimination
statutes. By placing the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove just
cause, it eliminates the difficulties presented by the present method of allocation
4 22 My proposal does not violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The
Seventh Amendment was passed in 1791 and preserves the right to a jury trial. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VII. To determine whether the parties have the right to a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment, the court will consider whether the cause of action is analogous to a
cause of action existing at law at the time of passage of the Seventh Amendment and the type
of remedies the plaintiff seeks. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-25 (1987).
Recently, the Court has placed more emphasis on the remedy. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and
Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1990). If the remedy is damages, there
will be a jury trial right that Congress cannot abrogate through statute. See id. at 565. If,
however, the remedy sought is equitable, there is no right to a jury trial. See id. Because the
arbitration portion of my proposal would grant reinstatement with back pay, but would not
offer compensatory and punitive damages to wronged employees, there should be no
constitutional right to a jury trial abrogated by the statute. My proposal continues to grant jury
trials to plaintiffs alleging a loss of dignity and compensatory and punitive damages.
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of shifting burdens and properly places the burden on the party who is in
exclusive control of the information. By eliminating the need to prove the
employer's intent, the scheme focuses on the employer's behavior rather than
its thought process, which has always been difficult to prove. By requiring that
the property loss claims be brought before arbitration panels, the model avoids
overburdening the federal courts423 and makes the process more affordable to
litigants. Arbitration also permits a much faster resolution of the employment
dispute, which will permit both the employer and the employee to move beyond
the dispute.
Assuming that discharge or refusals to promote without good cause can be
rational, an assumption that I have substantiated in Part I.C.4.c above, the
question becomes whether creating a just cause standard is worth the cost.
Although a complete cost analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, it appears
that the costs of this proposal would not exceed its value. Whereas the costs of
arbitration could be substantial, employers will avoid extensive, costly
employment discrimination litigation cases, 424 as well as large awards granted
under common law exceptions to the employment at will doctrine.425 The
423 This scheme will actually eliminate from the federal court dockets most of the
employment discrimination cases brought in federal court. Although it adds an appellate
function for the federal courts, the scope of review is limited.
424 Employers are already spending vast amounts defending these suits and trying to
avoid litigation. See DuNLoP CoMMIssION FACr FIND NG REPORT, supra note 47.
Furthermore, there are different possible scenarios for funding the arbitrators' fees. If the
employer were to fund the entire amount of the fees, the integrity of the arbitration would be
suspect. If each side bears its own costs, the fees could be expensive for employees who have
lost their jobs. A possible solution would be to permit the arbitrators to order that the
employer pay the entire fee amount if there is no just cause. If just cause is found, the
employee would be responsible for a portion of the fees equal to two days' salary. The
employer would pay the balance. A third possibility would be for there to be a fund collected
by the government similar to the interest funds on lawyers' trust accounts that would pay the
arbitrators' fees. This system would guarantee the integrity of the panel.
425 Although the causes of action in tort for loss of dignity will survive, causes of action
based on contract principles such as employee handbooks will not survive. Even those persons
having a dignity loss claim may forego a suit for dignity loss and go to arbitration to be
reinstated instead. Although they would have the right to bring suit in court after
reinstatement, for purposes of industrial peace, they may give up that right in favor of
reinstatement.
This scheme should reduce the cost of wrongful discharge claims. A recent study of
plaintiffs receiving jury awards in wrongful discharge cases in California from 1980-1986
demonstrates that the average payment a winning plaintiff receives after deducting attorney's
fees is $125,000 whereas the combined average sum of plaintiff's and defense's attorney's
fees is $164,000. The transaction costs are nearly 60% of the total amount of money changing
hands. See DERTOUZOS Er AL., supra note 318, at ix. Although the study notes that this
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administrative costs would become ordinary costs of doing business. 426
Moreover, the costs of additional paperwork should be minimal. Most
employers already keep personnel files on each employee, and the EEOC
requires employers to produce information on demographics similar to that
proposed here.
To the extent that the costs exceed those already spent by business, the
scheme will encourage employers to think twice before firing employees
without cause. If the employer has cause to dismiss the employee, the
arbitration should be a relatively short, easy, and informal process.
Furthermore, the intangible benefit of increased industrial peace in the
workplace could well lead to higher productivity among workers. 427 Nothing in
this proposal would preclude the establishment of in-house dispute resolution
centers that, if properly designed and administered with large-scale employee
participation, could potentially reduce the disagreements between management
and labor and prevent many of the discharges from occurring that would take
place in the absence of such procedures. 428 By addressing potential conflicts
early in the process, the presence of these procedures should reduce litigation
and arbitration costs.
Neither should the just cause requirement lead to a higher rate of
unemployment and a less vigorous economy. Critics of the German and French
systems complain that in Germany429 and France430 the law leads to a higher
rate of unemployment. In France, for example, under a recent law entitled the
1993 Loi Aubrey, the highest French court, the Cour de Cassation, blocked a
planned layoff of a construction company because the plan did not include
information on the number and nature of jobs in the community available to
employees losing their jobs.431 French employers argue that as a result of the
amounts to only $2.56 per worker per year, and the total estimated expense including cases
settled is $12.25 per worker per year, this number does not take into account the costs to the
system to process these claims. See id. at ix-x.
426 The cost will provide some incentive to the employer to assure that just cause exists
before discharging an employee. If the costs become too routine, the employer may have less
of an incentive to avoid the cost of arbitrations. If this were to happen the deterrence purpose
of the civil rights statutes could be compromised.
427 Another question concerning costs is who should bear the cost. There are emotional
as well as financial costs to employees who do not have job security. See supra notes 342-44
and accompanying text.
428 The Dunlop Commission endorses the establishment of in-house dispute resolution
centers with wide-scale employee participation in design and implementation. See DuNLoP
CoMMwssioN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 48, at 28-29.429 See infra note 435 for a description of the German dismissal law.
430 See infra note 434 for a description of the French dismissal law.
431 See Judgment of May 17, 1995, Cass. Soc., 1995 Bull. Civ. I, No. 159, at 116; see
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Loi Aubrey they hesitate before hiring new employees because the law makes it
so difficult to lay off employees if there is a decline in business.432 They also
argue that the presence of the law discourages foreign investment. 433
The labor laws in France434 and Germany435 are much more restrictive of
also Martin Du Bois & Anne Michele Morice, Judges in France Allowed to Block Plans for
Layoffs, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1995, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 8714731.432 See DuBois & Morice, supra note 431.
433 See id.
4 3 4 In France, since 1973, employers can dismiss only for a "real and serious" cause.
When dismissing for cause, the employers must grant employees internal hearings.
Employees have the right to the presence of an employee representative at the hearing. See
Rojot, supra note 413, at 116, 118. Before 1975, French law did not separate dismissal or
layoffs for economic reasons from dismissal for cause. In 1975, a new law passed that created
for the first time the concept of dismissal for economic reasons. See id. at 116. The 1975 act
required an employer to secure the approval of the appropriate administrative body before
dismissing an individual employee or a group of employees for economic reasons. See id. The
1975 act, however, failed to define "economic reason" and its interpretation fell to the courts.
See id. In 1986 and 1989, new acts deleted the requirement to secure administrative approval
before firing an employee or group of employees for an economic reason and defined
"economic reason" for the first time. See id. Even after this change in the law, however, the
difference between firing an employee for cause and letting an employee go for an economic
reason remained. See id. at 117. Even though an employer could dismiss an employee for
economic reasons without administrative approval, the employer was subject to extremely
complex regulations and procedures "fraught with room for error," giving the administration
significant power over the employer. Id. at 137.
Moreover, after the change in the law in 1986, the courts were given the power of
deciding whether the dismissal for economic reason was justified. See id. The supreme civil
court has since created an obligation of employers to adapt their workforces to the changing
needs of the business by offering training to their employees. See id. The court has also
required employers to "bump" employees who would be laid off for economic reasons into
other vacant positions in the enterprise. See id. at 137-38.
435 In Germany, the law against dismissal has a long tradition. Manfred Weiss,
Germany, in EMPLOYMENT SEcuRrlY LAw AND PRACnCE, supra note 371, at 139, 142.
Employers are permitted to dismiss employees for extraordinary reasons based on
misconduct, incompetence, or severe economic circumstances. See id. at 144. An "ordinary
dismissal," however, is not normally permitted. There are three exceptions: economic
reasons, employee behavior that does not amount to an extraordinary dismissal, and a
situation where the worker (through illness or other reason) is unable to fulfill the
requirements of his job. See id. at 145. Where the employer dismisses for economic reasons,
the employer must prove the economic situation. And, even if an economic or other reason
could justify the dismissal, the dismissal is unlawful if the employee can be transferred to
another job of comparable working conditions within the company, either immediately or
after retraining. See id. at 146.
Before every dismissal, the employer is obligated to consult with the works council, an
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the employer's prerogative than my proposal. The provisions in those countries'
laws requiring either administrative approval436 or notice of and consultation
with employee organizations437 before collective dismissals simply do not exist
in my plan. Although my plan would require just cause for dismissals, it does
not limit the employer's right to lay off or collectively dismiss employees where
organization that exists in every workplace to represent all employees' interests, unionized
and non-unionized. See id. at 150. If the employer fails to notify the works council, the
dismissal is null and void. See id. The works council examines the legality of the employer's
planned dismissal. It can object to the dismissal. An objection must be communicated in
writing to the employer. See id. The employer must give a copy of the objection to the
employee at the time of the dismissal. Such an objection sets out the challenges to the
dismissal. See id. at 151. Moreover, if the works council objects, the employer must keep the
employee in the position through the legal process, unless the employer secures an injunction
by proving that continuing employment would be an "intolerable economic burden." Id.
Once dismissal takes place, individual employees have the right to sue in labor court for
wrongful discharge. See id. at 154. The German labor courts are a three-tiered system: courts
of the first instance, courts of appeal, and the federal labor court. See id. Reinstatement is the
ordinary remedy, but is difficult to achieve if the individual employee has not continued
working during the legal action. See id. at 154-55. The question whether an employee has the
right to remain in his position until the end of the legal action has been an important issue in
Germany. See id. at 155. In 1985, the federal labor court determined that an employee for
whom the court of first instance rules has the right to immediate reinstatement pending
appeals of the employer. See id.
There are additional burdens on employers seeking collective dismissals. Employers are
required to notify the State labor exchange office in writing about all measures the employer
intends to take within the next twelve months that may lead to collective dismissals. See id. at
148. They must give advance notice in writing to the State labor exchange office before the
collective dismissals are announced. See id. The State labor exchange office has little power,
however; it can merely delay the collective dismissal with the intent to find alternative
solutions for those being dismissed. See id. at 149.
The real power in the law lies in the employer's relationship with the works council.
Early in the planning stages, the employer must give the works council the full information
concerning its plan and all possible alternatives. See id. at 151-152. The employer must reach
a "compromise of interests" with the works council. See id. at 152. This provision requires
that the employer try to work out with the works council whether and how it will carry out its
dismissal plan. See id. If the employer and the works council do not reach an agreement,
either side can request the President of the State labor exchange office to act as a mediator.
See id. If the mediation does not resolve the dispute or if neither side requests mediation,
either side may take the issue to the arbitration committee, a group composed of an equal
number of employers and works council representatives. See id. The arbitration committee,
however, does not have the power to require the employer to alter or abandon its plan for
dismissal. See id.
4 36 See supra notes 434-35.
437 See supra note 435.
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there is a serious economic downturn. If an employer's decision to collectively
dismiss employees were challenged by an individual employee, the employer
would merely have to show that its reason for the collective dismissal or layoff
was economic and that it treated its employees in a nondiscriminatory fashion
when it selected them for layoffs. Moreover, because of the presence in my
proposal of a probationary period in which the employer could fire the
employee for any reason other than illegal discrimination,438 employers should
not hesitate to hire new employees because of the risk of having to fire them.439
Studies in Great Britain of management attitudes have shown that only eight
percent of firms surveyed expressed reluctance to hire additional staff because
of the job protection laws in Great Britain.440 Instead of failing to hire new
employees, employers reacted to the job security laws passed in Britain in the
1970s by taking greater care in selection of persons to hire.441 The laws have
had a positive effect: they have "stimulated the spread and formalisation of
grievance and disciplinary procedures, enhanced the role and status of
personnel managers and employers' associations and encouraged employers,
especially larger ones, in adopting more efficient recruitment and discipline
practices." 442 The just cause requirement in the British law has led to the
establishment of internal procedures. 443 Companies with internal procedures
have a lower rate of suits filed against them in court.444 As a result, only
approximately 10% of British employees dismissed for reasons other than
layoffs file unfair dismissal suits.445 In Montana, the only state to have passed
438 The right to charge an employer with firing an employee for membership in a
protected class will survive even during the probationary period. This right, however, already
exists and will not be substantially affected by the proposal except that the employee will be
required to bring the claim to arbitration, a much less expensive forum. This is not harmful to
the employer's interests.
439 Another fear may be that part-time and temporary workers will replace full-time
workers so that employers can escape the requirements of the law. This is probably not a
realistic fear in most businesses because part-time and temporary workers are often not a
realistic option.
440 See RicHARD W. PAINTER & KEm PmrrcK, FmPLOYMENT RIGHTS: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 8 (1993) (citing S. EvANs Er AL., UNFAm DIsMmsAL LAw AND EwPLOYImNT
PRAcncE IN TnE 1980s, DES REsEcH PAPER 53 (1985)).
441 See id.
442 Id. at7.
443 See Newman, supra note 410, at 427-28. In Britain, the percentage of companies
with internal discharge procedures went from 8% in 1969, before the first British law was
passed, to 83% of small employers and 99% of large employers in 1980, after the law went
into effect. See id.
44 See id.
445 See id at 427.
[Vol. 57:1443
RETHNKING CIVIL RIGHTS
legislation requiring just cause for discharge, the unemployment rate has
declined from 7.4% in 1987 when the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act was
passed to 5.5 % in 1995. 446 Obviously, that Act did not create a greater rate of
unemployment.
Richard Epstein has argued that the antidiscrimination laws actually
discourage employers from hiring members of protected classes because
employers are afraid that they will not be able to fire them.447 Although I
believe that Epstein overemphasizes employers' fear of hiring members of
protected classes, abolishing the antidiscrimination laws altogether and
maintaining the employment at will doctrine would not be the best solution. To
the extent that Epstein's theory is true, my system will treat all employees the
same; they will all have the right to maintain their jobs absent just cause for
their dismissals. Therefore, there should be little incentive to hire white males
over members of protected classes. Moreover, I do not propose the complete
abolition of the antidiscrimination statutes. Rather, my proposal will eliminate
individual discharge cases from the federal antidiscrimination laws. If the
EEOC has the discharge cases off its docket, it can focus on investigating and
bringing failure to hire cases and other class actions under the systemic
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. This use of the EEOC's
resources should more efficiently encourage employers to avoid discrimination
in hiring, a function that the antidiscrimination law is not currently serving.448
Neither relocation of American businesses outside of the United States nor
competitive disadvantage in the international marketplace is a likely outcome of
my proposal because the vast majority of countries in the industrialized449
international market have already incorporated just cause standards into their
laws protecting workers. 450
This proposal is politically feasible. With the support of civil rights
advocates who understand that the civil rights in employment acts are not
working well, there would be a natural, very well-organized, and powerful
combination. The union of civil rights and workers' rights advocates should
446 See MONTANA DEP'T OF LABOR & INDus., RESEARCH & ANALYSIS BuRFAu, Annual
Average Labor Force for Montana, 1985-1995 (1996).
447 See EPsTEN, supra note 286, at 262-66.
448 See supra Part ll.B.
449 Most developed countries have a just cause requirement for dismissal. See infra note
450. Many Third World countries already have laws that are more favorable to business, and
American companies are not abandoning production in the United States. One reason may be
the difficulty businesses have in those countries.
450 See Plasencia, supra note 371, at 318 (citing to Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Comm. on Labor and Employment Law, At-Will Employment and the Problem of
Unjust Dismissal, 36 TDm RECORD 170, 175 (1981) (noting that in 1981 60 countries provided
statutory protections against unjust discharge)).
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permit passage of more effective legislation because reform advocates would
not have to compromise workers' interests to those of employers in order to
have sufficient support for passage of pro-worker legislation.
In any event, my proposal may gain the support of employers because it
permits employers to avoid the costly and lengthy litigation brought for civil
rights violations and public policy and contractual violations based on
handbooks. The legislature in Montana passed a just cause requirement which
was backed by employers precisely because the Montana courts had liberally
interpreted the covenant of good faith exception to the employment at will
doctrine.451 Although labor unions may be wary of this proposal, the British
experience demonstrates that wrongful discharge statutes coexist with healthy
unions. 452 In fact, European unions see the existence of wrongful discharge
statutes as aids in their organizing efforts.453 Moreover, union representatives
often represent employees in Britain at the hearings contesting the discharge. 454
Although the Montana statute and the Model Act are not acceptable to
employees, they are a beginning in the process. My proposal takes that process
one step forward, incorporating the discharge provisions of the employment
discrimination statutes into a comprehensive discharge scheme that respects
employers' interests while treating all employees fairly.
451 Schranun, supra note 379, at 95.
452 See Warren Martin, Employment at Will: Just Cause Protection Through Mandatory
Arbitration, 62 WAsH. L. REv. 151, 169 (1987).
453 See id. at 169-70.
454 See id. at 170.
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